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LITIGATING GENOCIDE: A CONSIDERATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN LIGHT OF
THE GERMAN JEWS' LEGAL RESPONSE TO NAZI
PERSECUTION, 1933-1941
Jody M. Prescott*
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of negotiation, a majority of the nations of the world have agreed
to create an International Criminal Court.l It will be given jurisdiction over three
core types of offenses: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 2 With
regard to war crimes, however, nations that join the court may take advantage of
an "opt-out" procedure, whereby the court's jurisdiction over these offenses may
be rejected for seven years after the court comes into existence.3 For various
reasons, a small number of nations, including the United States, have refused to
sign the treaty creating the court.4 While heralded as a breakthrough in the protec-
tion of individuals and minority groups from crimes against humanity, 5 it remains
to be seen how effective the court will be against the worst of such crimes, geno-
* Major, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps; B.A., University of Vermont, 1983;
J.D., University of Maine School of Law, 1986; LL.M. (International and Comparative Law),
Georgetown University Law Center, 1990; LL.M. (Military Law), The Judge Advocate General's
School. The opinions expressed in this article are my own, and do not represent the views of the
Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or The Judge Advocate General's Corps. I wish to thank
Professor David Gregory, University of Maine School of Law, and Professor Sherman Cohn,
Georgetown University Law Center, for their invaluable advice and direction on this project;
and Mr. Frederic Alberti and Mr. Hermann Simon for the time they spent reviewing my initial
drafts and being interviewed. Above all, I wish to thank my wife Brenda-Lee for her support
and encouragement during the time it took to complete this project.
1. See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, But Accord Is Reached on War-Crime Court, N.Y.
TtmEs, July 18, 1998, atA3.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 5, para. l(a)-(c), 37
I.L.M. 999, 1003-4 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The court was also given jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, see id. at art. 5, para. 1(d), 37 I.L.M., once a provision defining the offense
is decided upon under the amendment procedure found in the Statute. See id. at art. 121, paras.
1-3, 5, 37 I.L.M. 1067.
3. See id. at art. 124, 37 I.L.M. 1068.
4. One hundred twenty countries voted in favor of the new court as finally negotiated, seven
voted against it, and 21 abstained. Countries which voted no include the United States, China,
Israel, India, Iraq, and Libya. See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, But Accord Is Reached on
War-Crime Court, N.Y. Tmms, July 18, 1998, at A3; George Melloan, In Rome, U.S. Realism
Trumps Illusions, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at A19. While the U.S. was concerned that the
court as structured would interfere with military operations abroad and subject U.S.
servicemembers to frivolous investigations, see Neil King, Jr., Nations Create War-Crimes Court
Despite U.S. Protest, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998, at A16 [hereinafter U.S. Protest], other coun-
tries were concerned that the court could become involved in their domestic affairs, or that the
West would dominate the court. See Neil King, Jr., Plans for Permanent War-Crimes Court
Face Big-Power Dispute on Jurisdiction, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1998, at A14.
5. See U.S. Protest, supra note 4, at A16.
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cide. Although the International Criminal Court is still in its infancy and untested,
this Article seeks to shed light on this question through a case study of the German
Jews' legal response to Nazi persecution between 1933 and 1941.
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the development of international
human rights law and its enforcement mechanisms. Part II will set out the histori-
cal background of the German Jews' legal response in the Third Reich and those
areas of Germany under League of Nations administration. Part I will describe
the legal response in the Third Reich, while Part IV will focus on the legal re-
sponse in the League of Nations areas and compare it with the response in Ger-
many proper. In conclusion, Part V considers the International Criminal Court in
light of the experiences of German Jewish litigants before the various national and
international fora, and suggests that although international courts can have an im-
pact on the prevention of genocide, their positive effect is more pronounced when
genocide's precursors are adjudicated rather than its aftermath.
IL THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWY AND ENFORCEMeNT
MECHANISMS
Beginning with the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide of December 9, 1948,6 one of the most important trends in the devel-
opment of international law since the atrocities of World War II has been the cre-
ation of a new international order of human rights through numerous treaties, con-
ventions, and multilateral declarations.7 The development of domestic law in many
nations has mirrored this trend. Canada, since 1970, has prohibited the advocacy
of genocide8 and the public communication of statements which either incite ha-
tred against "identifiable" groups and are likely to breach the peace,9 or willfully
promote hatred against such groups.10 Germany has enacted similar legislation.
6. 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Genocide is defined as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial orreligious group as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. art. II, at 280. Article 6 of the Rome Statute adopts this definition. See Rome Statute at art.
6,37 I.L.M. 1004.
7. See, e.g., International Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (II1), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
Part I, Resolutions at7l U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 2 UNrrnE NATtos RFxstoumO.s at
135 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316(1966), reprinted in 11 UNrrao NATIONS RnsoLrroxs, at 165 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed.,
1975); The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975), reprinted in 15 Utrrm
NArlONS RESOLUTIONs, at 531 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1984).
8. See Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 11, § 281.1 (1st Supp. 1970). For a description
of the application and effect of the Canadian race-hate laws, see Ronda Bessner, The Constitu-
tionality of the Group Libel Offences in the Canadian Criminal Code, 17 MAN. LJ. 183 (1988).
9. See Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 11, § 281.2(l) (lst Supp. 1970).
10. See id. at § 281.2(2).
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The German Penal Code prohibits incitement to hatred "in a manner apt to breach
the public peace" against segments of the population, 11 as well as the dissemina-
tion or exhibition of writings which incite hatred. 12 These provisions are supple-
mented by the offense of criminal insult,13 which, as of 1985, no longer requires
that those insulted bring a petition themselves, so long as those persons were mem-
bers of a group that suffered Nazi persecution. 14 Although the United States lacks
federal legislation equivalent to the Canadian and German statutes, almost all of
the states now have some form of hate-crime legislation. 15
It is one thing to develop new law; it is often quite another to enforce it, par-
ticularly in the international arena. A unique example in this regard is the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16
which has established perhaps the most rigorous set of enforcement mechanisms
to protect individual and group rights. The European Convention guarantees all
people within the respective jurisdictions of the signatories due process of law,
freedom from torture or inhumane treatment, the right to liberty and security of
person, and the freedom of thought and expression, among other rights. 17 The
European Convention allows signatories, organizations, and individuals to peti-
tion the European Commission of Human Rights as to alleged violations of the
convention by any member state. 18 If a solution is not obtained through the
Commission's conciliation process, 19 a case may be brought before the European
Court of Human Rights by the Commission itself, a signatory whose national is an
alleged victim, the country that referred the case to the Commission initially, or the
country against which the case has been brought.20 The rigor of the European
Convention is enhanced by provisions which make the European Court's deci-
sions binding on the parties, and by the requirement of six months' notice of any
member's denunciation of the Convention.2 1 "
11. See Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-And Other-"Lies," 85 MicH. L. R . 277,322 (1986) [hereinafter Stein] (quot-
ing art. 130 StGB).
12. See id at 322-23 (citing art. 131 StGB).
13. See id. at 323 (citing art. 185 StGB).
14. See i. (citing art. 194 StGB).
15. See Rorie Sherman, Hate Crime Statutes Abound, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3. Al-
though criminal libel laws are not per se unconstitutional in the United States, see Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), Supreme Court decisions with regard to the scope of the First
Amendment have cast doubt on the validity of such laws. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The differences between the German
and the American jurisprudential systems in this regard is well illustrated by the trial of Gary
Lauck before a Hamburg criminal court in 1996. Lauck, a U.S. citizen, was tried for the dis-
tribution of anti-Semitic and Nazi materials in Germany via the mails, although they had been
legally produced in the United States. See Alan Cowell, German Court Begins Hearing Case of
American Neo-Nazi, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at A5.
16. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. See also J. SwEENY
ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 112-24 (1981).
17. See European Convention, supra note 16, arts. 1-15 at 224- 34.
18. See id., arts. 24-25, at 236-38.
19. See id., arts. 28-32, at 238-42.
20. See id., art. 48, at 246.
21. See id., arts. 53, 65(1), at 248, 252. The ultimate guarantor of European human rights,
however, will likely prove to be the ever increasing economic integration brought about under
the European Union.
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The concept of an international criminal court to enforce criminal violations
of international law is not new. In 1937, the League of Nations adopted a conven-
tion on international terrorism which included an international criminal court.22 A
sufficient number of nations failed to ratify the convention, however, and it failed
to come into effect.23 After the conclusion of the international military tribunals
in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, the United Nations again took
up the development of a standing international criminal court.24 Concerns among
many members as to the definition of "aggressive war" and the possible infringe-
ment upon national sovereignty through the international court's supervision of
national court systems stalled the project indefinitely. 5 It was not until 1993,
however, in the wake of the large scale atrocities against Croats and Muslims in
the former Yugoslavia by Serbs, that another international criminal court actually
came into being.26 The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia,27 followed a year later by the creation of a similar tribunal for
Rwanda,28 supplied an impetus to the successful efforts to finally bring about agree-
ment between nations to create a standing international criminal court.
IMI. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Genocide has been a fairly common occurrence during this century, from the
Turkish persecution and slaughter of its Armenian minority during World War 129
to the Nazi "Final Solution" to the "Jewish question" in World War II, to the Serbian
"ethnic cleansing" during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. 30 While each
occurrence of genocide is an individual product of various interacting factors,3 1
their respective developments seem to fit the general pattern described by noted
22. See Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10
DicrINsON J. I'L L. 223, 225 n.14 (1992).
23. See id at 225.
24. See id at 226-27.
25. MmCAEL P. ScauAR, BALKAN JusncE: THE STORY BuNmD Tim FIRST Ih'mrAnoNuA. V AR
Cpmas TRIAL SicE NrummRO 15 (1997).
26. See Statute of the International Tribunal, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993); Abner
Katzman, First War Crimes Tribunal Opens Since World War I, AssoclxrE PRESS, Nov. 17,
1993, available in WL4567498.
27. See Katzman, supra note 27.
28. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Ex-Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison On Charges of
Genocide in '94 Massacres, N.Y. Ttvws, Sep. 5, 1998. at A4.
29. See Marjorie Housepian, The Unremembered Genocide, GENOctDE AM HustAN RIzarrs: A
GLOBALANTmOLOGY 99 (Jack Porter ed., 1982) [hereinafter GENoCDE Arm HU.IA RiGHTs]; Leon
A. Chorbajian, Massacre or Genocide: An Essay in Personal Biography, GLNoCDu Alm HUtAN
RIGHTS 116.
30. See ScHAuR, supra note 25, at 29-60. Muslim Bosnians and Croatians were also guilty of
atrocities during the war, but their offenses do not appear to have been on the same scale as the
Serbian actions. See id at 71; Paul Watson, Digging For Truth in Sarajevo, Los ANGRELES TmES,
Nov. 27, 1998, at Al.
31. There are a number of factors which appear to be common to most occurrences of geno-
cide since 1900. These factors include an on-going armed conflict, an essentially one-party
government, and a dominant nationalistic and discriminatory ideology. See NoiusmN CIGAR.
GENoCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE PoLicy OF "Eamic C .ENsuNc" 21-83 (1995); Gb.ARD PRuNIER, THE
RWANA CRisis: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 45-76, 172-238 (1995); GENOciDE ANM HutAN RIGrs,
supra note 29, at 25; JOHN BARRON & AiHmoxv PAUL, MURDER OF A GurnLe LA=: THE UrroLD
STORY OF Co.vmrumsr GENOCDE tN CAMBODIA 40-76 (1977).
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Professor and Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg in his studies of the Holocaust.
Hilberg found the Nazi destruction of the Jews to be a four-stage process consist-
ing of the following: first, defining, and thereby isolating, the targeted group;
second, expropriating their assets; third, concentrating the targeted group; and fi-
nally, exterminating them.32 Progression through the first three stages of the pro-
cess does not necessarily mean the fourth and final stage will occur, and the time
frame within which each step occurs can be very compressed. 33 Under the right
set of political, social, and economic circumstances, however, the oppressing group
may see the final stage as a natural progression of the first three, as Nazi Germany
did with the Jews.3 4
What sets the Holocaust apart from other genocides, among other things, is
the fact that its precursors steadily evolved during the dismantling of a democracy
in a modem industrial state, a state in which the rule of law prevailed. As the thrust
of Nazi persecution moved from forcing Jewish emigration to setting the stage for
their eventual extermination, the German Jews were gradually stripped of all their
rights in a technically legal fashion. Because of the gradual pace of this divesti-
ture, and the increasingly basic nature of the rights involved, there was a signifi-
cant amount of litigation by German Jews concerning the loss of these rights. To
appreciate the legal and political climate within which the German Jewish legal
response began, and the factors which were to influence its course, it is useful first
to briefly review the German court system prior to 1933. Next, this Section will
examine the events which occurred, and the laws which came into being, after the
Nazi Party came to power in the early spring of 1933, as well as the resulting
impacts upon the German legal system. Lastly, for purposes of comparison, this
Section will briefly describe the circumstances of the court and mediative systems
in the German areas administered by the League of Nations.
A. The German Court System
The civil law German court system was composed of several different and co-
existing judicial hierarchies, each with its own subject-matterjurisdiction. 35 Cases
of private and criminal law were handled by judicial courts, while issues of public
law were brought before "administrative" courts. 36 The separate subject- matter
jurisdictions of the various courts were strictly protected, to the extent that a deci-
sion of a court lacking proper subject-matter jurisdiction was null and void.37 In
addition to having different jurisdictions, each hierarchy also had its own appellate
structure and procedure, with a corresponding senate of the national Supreme Court
as its forum of last resort.38
32. See RAUL ILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEws, RvSEvSD AND DErINmvE EDI-
TION 53, v. 1 (1985) [hereinafter REvisED EDmON].
33. For example, the treatment of Japanese-Americans by the United States during World
War II came uncomfortably close to meeting the first two stages, but never progressed toward
the extermination phase. See generally PETER IRONS, JUsTICE AT WAR (1983).
34. See REvisED EDrION, supra note 32, at 54.
35. See Ernst Fraenkel, Introduction to FRIEDA WUNDERLICH, GERMAN LABOR COURTS 4 (1946).
36. See id Under German law, at that time, a state agency need only be "subject to the law
and only the law," not superior officials to be a court. Id.
37. See id. at 6.
38. See FREIDA WUNDERLIcH, GERMAN LABOR COURTS 64 (1946).
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German judges were, as they are now, regarded primarily as civil servants.
Unlike their American counterparts, for whom "becoming a judge [was a] reward
for a long and successful practice as a member of the bar,"39 German judges were
ordinarily career jurists, who had chosen that particular career track at a very early
point in their professional lives.40 Although judges were independent with regard
to the decisions they rendered, their actions were always supervised by superior
officials within their particular judicial hierarchies. 41 The careers of young asso-
ciate judges were very dependent upon the reports they wrote, for in contrast to the
American system, decisions were anonymous and dissenting opinions were not
published.42
German courts also used a large number of laypersons as associate judges. At
the trial level in cases of criminal, administrative, and commercial law, learned
and lay judges together formed the court. 43 Ordinary private law cases, however,
were decided by courts composed solely of learned judges.44 The appellate courts
of some subject-matter jurisdictions also contained lay judges; but of the highest
courts,45 only the Supreme Labor Court had lay members on its bench.46
Questions of fact and law were decided by a majority vote of the court, for the
German judicial system made little use ofjuries.47 The jury trial in criminal cases
was abolished in 1924 after only forty-seven years of use, and juries had not been
used in private law cases since the early 1800s. Because of the reliance on bench
trials, there was little need for the development of formal rules of evidence. Under
German law, it was within the discretion of the court, and in large part the presid-
ing judge, to decide whether matters would be admitted into evidence.48 As with
the Anglo-American common-law system, there was a strong tendency to concen-
trate evidence at the trial level. Dissimilarly, parties before appellate courts in
private, criminal, and certain administrative law cases could introduce new evi-
dence and ask the courts to reexamine witnesses.49 The respective senates of the
Supreme Court, however, were restricted solely to questions of law.50 Precedent,
of course, played a very different role in the deliberative process of a German
39. See I. FORRESTmR & H. IGEN, THa GmtmAN LGAL. Sysmi 23 (1972).
40. See Fraenkel, supra note 35, at 14.
41. See id.
42. See MARc Luam, TRE Supmm LABOR Cour l NAZI Gmw y: A Juumumnt ArLYsLs
91(1987).
43. See Fraenkel, supra note 35, at 8.
44. See id.
45. Because private law had been codified by federal statute in 1900, appeals from the state
courts of appeal to the Supreme Court were possible in nearly all cases, so long as ajurisdic-
tional amount requirement was met. See WuaNEltJuc supra note 35, at 206 n.3; see also Re-
visno EDON, supra note 32, at 67 Table 4-2.
46. See Fraenkel, supra note 35, at 10.
47. Although trial by jury had been introduced into the Rheinland-Palatinate as early as 1798
as a result of its occupation by French revolutionary forces, it was not until the passage of the
Court Organization Act in 1877 that the jury trial was once again available in Germany. See
JOHN P. RicHErr, NVast GmiAN LAY JUDGEs: REcRurIENTAND REPRESENATtVEN,'ESS 53,58 (1983).
The Emminger Reform of 1924 eliminated the trial by jury, and in its place instituted a court
composed of three learned judges and six lay judges. See id. at 60.
48. See Fraenkel, supra note 35, at 8.
49. See id at 10.
50. See idL
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court than its Anglo-American counterpart. Even decisions of the "supreme courts
did not create law and were not binding except in the particular case at issue., 5 1
The various senates of the Supreme Court were bound by each others' decisions;
and although courts could theoretically disregard Supreme Court decisions, their
lines of reasoning were generally followed by the inferior courts.52
B. The Boycott
In late January 1933, after a lengthy period of parliamentary stalemate and
increasing civil unrest, the Nazi Party was given the opportunity to form a govern-
ment out of the fractured and polarized German legislature, the Reichstag.53 Adolf
Hitler, as head of the Nazi Party, assumed the position of Chancellor in a coalition
cabinet, and immediately sought new national elections to solidify the party's po-
sition.54 After a rough and bitterly contested electoral campaign, the Nazi Party
coalition government emerged victorious in the March 5, 1933, national elections. 55
In the wake of the Nazi victory, Nazi critics and Jews alike were subjected to
vicious attacks and beatings by Nazi supporters in many areas of Germany,5 6 and
local units of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the primary Nazi paramilitary organization
at that time, began an "unofficial" and often violent boycott of German Jewish
merchants and professionals throughout Germany.57 Jewish judges and attorneys
in many cities were forcibly removed from courthouses by SA units,5 8 and those
who attempted to enter the courthouses were often threatened with bodily harm. 59
While the SA resorted to street violence to harass Jewish legal professionals, the
Schutzstaffeln (SS), Hitler's elite bodyguard unit, incarcerated many Jewish law-
yers in its newly created concentration camp at Dachau. 60
As the boycott progressed, the bureaucracies of the German states began to
act against Jewish legal professionals. Several states removed Jewish judges from
the criminal divisions of their court systems and placed them in civil divisions, or
convinced them to take indefinite leaves. 6 1 While the various state restrictions
51. WUNDERLICH, supra note 38, at 110.
52. See id. at 111.
53. See CALVIN B. HoovER, GERMANY EN'ERS TH THIRD RETcH 93 (1933).
54. See id. at 97, 108.
55. See id. at 122-23.
56. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE HOLOCAUST 33 (1985).
57. See HoovER, supra note 53, at 102-03. The office signs of Jewish attorneys in certain
cities were defaced, and placards bearing the word "Jew" were stuck over them, for example.
See Boycott of Jews, TIMES (London), Apr. 3, 1933, at 14. Although the Nazi government distin-
guished between "unofficial" boycott actions and an official boycott which was held on April 1,
1933, the only real difference appears to be that there was more anti-Jewish violence on that day
in more places throughout Germany than just before or after it.
58. See Nazis Oust Jews from Law Courts, N.Y. TIMaS, Apr. 1, 1933, at 10, col. 7; Nazi
Boycott Of Jews, TIMES (London), Apr. 1, 1933, at 10; Frederick Birchall, Boycott Spreads
Throughout Reich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1933, at 12; Opening Of New Reichstag, TIMEs (Lon-
don), Mar. 20, 1933, at 11; Germany Under Nazi Rule, TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 1933, at 13.
59. Interview with Frederic M. Alberti, Esq. (Aug. 17, 1985) [hereinafter Alberti Interview].
60. See GILBERT, supra note 56, at 32, 40. Between April and October 1933, at least four
Jewish lawyers were among those killed at Dachau. See id. at 37-38, 41.
61. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEws 86 (1961). These states
included Baden, Bavaria, Hessen, Prussia, Saxony, and Wuerttemberg. See id. at 86 n.4.
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were often quite similar in content, their implementation in the beginning was not
uniform. For example, some states, like Bavaria, issued piecemeal decrees re-
stricting Jewish lawyers and judges in stages throughout March and early April
1933.62 Other states, such as Prussia, issued comprehensive decrees, simultaneously
suspending notaries, 63 banning Jewish prosecutors and court officials, and limit-
ing the number of Jewish lawyers with a numerus clausus simultaneously.6 4
C. 7he Judiciary and Courts after 1933
At the national level, the Nazi government began translating its gains in the
national election into the power to rule as it saw fit. After the Reichstag recon-
vened on March 24, 1933, one of its first acts was to approve the "Law to Remove
the Distress of the People and State," better known as the Enabling Act.65 This
law authorized the national cabinet to enact legislation free from practically all
controls, and by doing so gave the Nazi Revolution the force of law by ensuring its
continued implementation in a technically legal fashion.66 Because of its scope,
the Enabling Act was by its terms a constitutional amendment, and its passage by
a two-thirds vote of the Reichstag conformed with the constitutional amendment
procedure. 67 On the basis of the Enabling Act, and the later National Reconstruc-
tionAct, "legislation" increasingly consisted of decrees passed by the cabinet with-
out any consideration by the Reichstag.6 8 These decrees frequently contained only
general principles, the elaboration of which was left to subordinate authorities. 69
Thus began what German attorney and legal historian Ernst Fraenkel described
as a "dual state,"7 0 that is, a normative state and a co-existing and superior pre-
rogative state. Despite its dominant position, the Nazi Party could not exercise its
authority over every aspect of German life, nor could the state function if it did.
By necessity, the Nazi Party was forced to rely upon the existing bureaucracies to
62. See Boycott of Jews, TiMES (London), Apr. 3, 1933, at 14; Germany Under the Nazis,
Tiars (London), Mar. 27, 1933, at 11.
63. See AEmEuCAN JEWISH Co.mirrms, THE JEWs IN NAzi GErntwr' 36 (1982).
64. See Nazis Oust Jews from Law Courts, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 1, 1933, at 10. German notaries
received the same legal education as lawyers or judges, but were specially licensed to draft and
authenticate legal documents such as wills and contracts. See Letter from Hans 1. Frank, Esq.,
to Major Jody M. Prescott (Nov. 13, 1985); see also Alberti Interview, supra note 59. Interest-
ingly, the Prussian Ministry of Justice Comissar, Hans Kerrl, also decreed a stay against judg-
ments in default in cases in which the Jewish attorneys had been prevented from appearing
because of the boycott. See Goering Wins Fight to Rule in Prussia, Replacing Papen, N.Y.
TMss, Apr. 9, 1933, at 2.
65. See Louis L. SNYm, Hrrtm's THnD Rmca 106-07 (1981).
66. See id.
67. See HoovER, supra note 53, at 116.
68. See Wu D.nucH, supra note 38, at 152.
69. See id.
70. Fraenkel described Germany as being ruled by two simultaneous states; a prerogative
state characterized by the exercise of "unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any
legal guarantees," and a normative state, which was an "administrative body endowed with
elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of courts,
and activities of the administrative agencies." ERNSr FmEAKEL., THE DuAL STATE xiii (1941).
The normative state was still needed to administer the country, but its benefit was restricted to
"constructive elements." See id. at xvi. Fraenkel emphasized that for purposes of his analysis,
the two states were not to be confused with the state and Nazi Party bureaucracies. See id. at
xiii.
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continue the efficient functioning of the government, including the courts.7 1 Here,
the Nazi Party faced a particularly thorny problem, for unlike more typically ad-
ministrative bodies, the courts had a long tradition of independence and impartial-
ity which made it difficult to merely substitute one set of decisional criteria for
another. However, by changing the substantive and procedural law which the courts
applied, purging the courts of "undesirable" personnel, and shrinking the norma-
tive jurisdiction of the courts, the Nazi government eventually eliminated the courts
as an obstacle in its quest for complete power over Germany.
1. Jurisprudence
Although anti-Jewish decrees tended to be interpreted strictly at first, over
time Nazi Party dogma and the pronouncements of Nazi officials increasingly be-
came the rules of decision in most cases involving Jews, even when a specific anti-
Jewish statute did not apply to the case under consideration. 72 For example, in
1935 a Jewish man and his "Aryan ''7 3 fiancee sought a marriage license from the
Bad Sulsa registry office, and were refused. The man brought suit against the
registry office clerk, and the court found for the defendant. The court noted that
although there was no legal ban on marriages between Jews and Aryans, no offi-
cial could be compelled to authorize a marriage that would adulterate Aryan blood,
and therefore render it useless to the nation for all time. 74
Further, important safeguards were eliminated as judicial procedures were
streamlined and simplified. For example, in late 1938, a decree which invalidated
Jewish drivers' licenses was not submitted to the official register as required by
law, and instead was only published in a newspaper. The legality of the decree was
contested in court, and the case eventually reached a senate of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that because other government agencies were aware of
the regulation and had not challenged it, the unusual method of publication did not
invalidate the decree.75 Perhaps one of the most important normative safeguards
done away with in the devolution of German law under the Third Reich was the
concept of equality of the parties before the law. Enemies of the state were denied
71. See LINDER, supra note 42, at 1. By its nature, efficient bureaucratic operation requires
consistency and reliability, both in the decision-making process and in the decisions themselves.
It is therefore no surprise that the various bureaucracies tended to interpret and apply the gener-
ally phrased Nazi statutes restrictively at first, and only where the statutes expressly changed
existing law. See FRAENKEL, supra note 70, at 59 n.187. This tendency must have been rein-
forced by the fact that on average, over half of all senior civil servants had graduated from law
school. See RICHARD GRUNBERGER, THE 12-YEAR REICH 117 (1971).
72. See WUNDERLICH, supra note 36, at 169.
73. The term "non-Aryan" was defined in the Regulation of April 11, 1933, as pertaining to
any person who had a Jewish parent or grandparent. The parent or grandparent was presumed to
be Jewish if that person adhered to the Jewish faith. See HiLBERG, supra note 61, at 45. The
word "Aryan" is of Sanskrit origin, and originally denoted the group of Indo-European people
who occupied the Iranian plateau in prehistoric times, and from whose speech the Indo-Euro-
pean languages are derived. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 125 (1965).
For purposes of clarity in discussing Nazi laws and court decisions, "Aryan" as used in this
article will refer to non-Jewish Germans.
74. See Jew Forbidden To Marry "Aryan," TIMES (London), July 13, 1935, at 11.
75. See RvisED EDTON, supra note 32, v. 3, at 995-96.
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the laws' protection, while Nazi officials received a great deal of deference before
the courts, both as parties and as attorneys.7 6
2 Personnel
On April 7, 1933, the Nazi government issued the "Law for the Restoration of
the Civil Service" (Civil Service Law).77 Under its provisions, government and
"indirect" officials (executives of certain corporations and businesses that had a
quasi-public function) of non-Aryan descent were to be retired.78 As a concession
to President von Hindenburg, 7 9 however, an exemption was made for non-Aryan
officials who had seen front-line service in World War I, who had lost a father or a
son in that conflict, or who had been in office before 1914.80 The Civil Service
Law also provided that officials who "indicated by their previous political activity
that they [would] not exert themselves for the national state without reservation"
were to be dismissed, and those officials whose absence would "simplify adminis-
tration" were to be retired.8 1 Although a significant number of Jewish judicial
officials fell within the Civil Service Law exemptions, the Nazi government used
these additional provisions of the statute to dismiss many of them.82 Finally, all
actions taken by the government in restructuring the civil service were final, with
no allowance for recourse by affected individuals.83
Those Jewish judicial officials who remained in office were excluded from
adjudicating criminal cases, and were often reassigned to inferior courts.84 Even
in these reduced circumstances, however, Jewish judges continued to experience
great difficulty in carrying out the functions of their positions. On March 5, 1934,
for example, a Berlin Court of Appeal held that it was proper for a party to reject
the use of a Jewish judge because "it was contrary to [the litigant's] National So-
cialist view of life."'85 Similarly, on November 10, 1935, a Berlin District Court
76. See WuNoZiuci, supra note 38, at 167-68. A significant number of Jewish litigants
apparently took advantage of the preferential treatment accorded Nazi officials by the courts, for
the Nazi Party issued a nationwide decree on September 13, 1935, forbidding all Party officials
and the higher officials of subordinate organizations from acting as attorneys for Jews or for
Jewish firms. See Three Anti-Semites Jailed, N.Y. Tts, Sep. 14, 1935, at 5. "While certain
Nazis refused to take the money of Jewish clients, this arrangement was consistent with fascist
ideology. The Rechtswahrer (German law guardian), it was argued, could never share 'Jewish
interests,' so it was impossible for any conflict of interest to occur." Udo Reifner, The Bar in the
ThirdReich:Anti-Semitism andthe Decline of LiberalAdvocacy, 32 McGt.L.J. 96. 118 (1986).
77. SNYDRm, supra note 65, at 111-12.
78. See id.
79. A translation of the correspondence between President von Hindenburg and Chancellor
Hitler in this regard can be found in Y. A.n ET AL, Docuumrs ON Tu HotocAusr 37-39 (1981).
80. See SNYDER, supra note 65, at 111-12. As of June 30. 1933, all non-Aryan lay assessors
and commercial judges were removed from office without exception. A~ tcANJEwisi Co.%5trr-
TEE, supra note 63, at 144-46. Jewish law clerks were also removed from their positions. LET-
TER, supra note 64.
81. See SinER, supra note 66, at 111-12.
82. See HILBERG, supra note 61, at 56.
83. See SNYDER, supra note 66, at 111-12.
84. See OscAR I. JANOwsKY & MELvIN M. FAGEN, INTERNAtmoNAL AsiErs or GEutAN RAciA.
Po,,cms 202 (1937), citing Juristische Wochenschrift (J.I.), at 442 (1934).
85. See id., citing J..IV, at 1,178 (1934).
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held that a Jewish judge was incompetent to try a case brought by a Nazi Party
member against a Jewish debtor because the judge lacked the "necessary impar-
tiality" by virtue of his religion.86 Finally, under the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, all
Jewish officials were prohibited from serving in positions of public or quasi-pub-
lic employment, and the few remaining Jewish judicial officials were retired as of
December 31, 1935.87
Non-Jewish judicial personnel were subject to strong pressure to conform to
the new regime from sources both within and outside the judicial bureaucracies. 88
An anti-Nazi attitude was not only not conducive to promotion, it was also grounds
for dismissal from office.89 Although the content of judicial decisions was not
grounds for dismissal, it was indicative of political reliability.90 Judges were ex-
pected to demonstrate political reliability in ministerial matters as well. As early
as June 1933, judges could be dismissed if they gave appointments to Jewish law-
yers to represent indigents or to act as executors. 9 1 Unofficially, decisions incon-
sistent with the Nazi Party program were often criticized in Nazi Party subordinate
organizations' newspapers, like the'SS official organ, Schwarzes Korps.92 These
critiques were taken so seriously that the Ministry of Justice began officially pub-
lishing replies to SS criticisms of controversial court decisions in 1939.93
3. Jurisdiction
The states of the Weimar Republic, and of the German Empire before that,
bore the primary responsibility for the administration of justice. Under the Third
Reich, however, the responsibility for the administration of justice was gradually
assumed by the national government. 94 In so doing, the Nazi government increas-
ingly limited the area of activity to which the normative legal concepts of tradi-
tional German jurisprudence would apply by restricting thejurisdiction of the regular
courts. Certain matters were placed within the jurisdiction of newly created courts,
to be dealt with from a Nazi point of view. Social Honor Courts were established
to regulate the conduct of members of the various professions and trades, 95 and
the People's Court was created in 1934 to deal with "treason ' 96 and political ac-
86. See id., citing J.W., at 442 (1934).
87. See id. at 169 n.37. These judges, notaries, and other judicial officials may have been
unofficially "retired" as of early October, 1935. Otto Tolischus, Nazis in New Drive on Jews in
Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1935, at 13, col. 2.
88. On the whole, little pressure was required to cause much of the German judiciary to begin
to gleichschalten ("coordinate") with the new regime. See WUNDERLICH, supra note 35, at 186;
Alberti Interview, supra note 59. Interestingly, a number of judicial officials avoided "coordi-
nation" by leaving the civilian judiciary and joining the legal departments of the armed services,
which apparently retained most of their independence from the Nazi Party throughout the war.
A. DE ZAYAs, THE WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BuREAu, 1939-1945 22-23 (1990).
89. See SNYDER, supra note 65, at II1-12.
90. See WuNDERLicH, supra note 38, at 167.
9 1. See Racial Barriers In Berlin-New Rules For Lawyers, TIMES (London), July 5, 1933, at
13, col. d.
92. See GRUNBERGER, supra note 71, at 119.
93. See id.
94. See WuNDERLIcH, supra note 38, at 154.
95. See id at 143, 146, and 149.
96. "Treason" as construed by the People's Court included having a "hostile attitude" toward
National-Socialism. See FRAErNKi, supra note 70, at 49.
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tivities directed against the state.97 The Nazi Party also made use of Party Courts
to discipline and expel transgressing Party members for acts which normally would
have been adjudicated by normative courts.98 The jurisdiction of the normative
courts was further constricted by the use of administrative fiat to issue decrees in
special cases, and the removal of the "political sphere" of government and Nazi
Party activity or matters of state security from judicial review. For example, a
Jewish attorney who had emigrated from Germany after 1933 requested that he be
issued a birth certificate. When the Secret State Police, Gestapo,99 forbid the
registrar to issue the certificate, the applicant brought suit in a local court to com-
pel its issuance. The municipal court ordered the certificate to be issued, but its
decision was reversed by a court of appeal. Finally, in 1936, a senate of the Su-
preme Court upheld the court of appeal's decision, noting that the Gestapo claimed
that any issuance would involve matters of state security, and that the action taken
at the Gestapo's direction was, therefore, not subject to judicial review.100
D. The Bar
As with the judiciary, the German Bar presented a significant threat to the
totalitarian ambitions of the Nazi Party. Likewise, the Nazi Party acted quickly to
eliminate any potential resistance from the bar by eliminating opposition lawyers
and centralizing the bar's operation and administration. As a result of these changes
and the changes in the judicial system, those Jewish attorneys who were allowed
to practice found it increasingly difficult to represent their clients effectively.
1. Membership1 01
The bar membership of many Jewish lawyers was revoked by the 'Law Re-
garding Admission to the Bar" (Bar Admission Law), issued on April 17, 1933.102
The Bar Admission Law was similar to the Civil Service Law, and it also granted
exemptions to front-line fighters. 10 3 Later decrees eliminated non-exempt patent
97. See \VumNDcE , supra note 38, at 228 n.77.
98. See D. McKALE, THE NAzt PARrY Cotmrrs: HminR's MANAGEMBENrOF Co.\TUCriN HIS MovE-
mwr 165-66 (1974). In the aftermath of the Kristalinacht Pogrom of November 1938, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Party Court tried 30 Nazi Party members who had committed "excesses" in
the course of the riots. The 26 defendants who had killed Jews were generally exonerated and
retained in the Party, while four men who had sexually assaulted Jewish women were expelled
from the Party and tried by normative courts for the offense of Rassenschande (race pollution).
See id.
99. "Gestapo" is the German abbreviation for Geheime Staatspolizei.
100. See FRAErX;E4 supra note 70, at 44 n. 140.
101. The German bar was very stable and relatively prosperous through the early 1920s, but
by 1927 it was facing a trend of reduced demand for legal services as a result ofjudicial reforms
eliminating the use of lawyers in some courts. See WuN'nECac, supra note 38, at 121. The
trend was also partially due to an in increase in bar membership of 33 percent between 1923 and
1933, despite the steadily worsening economy at the beginning of the Great Depression. See
Kenneth C. H. Willig, The Bar in the Third Reich, 20 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 1, 4 (1976).
102. A HoLocAusrREADER40-41 (L. Davidowicz ed.) (1976).
103. See id. As with the Civil Service Law, the Bar Admission Law officially became effec-
tive in June 1933. See Interview with Hermann E. Simon, Esq. (Jan. 24, 1989) (hereinafter
Simon Interview].
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attorneys on April 22, 1933,104 and tax advisors on May 6, 1933.105 The Bar
Admission Law disbarred approximately 1,500 of the estimated 4,000 Jewish at-
torneys outright,1 06 and on the basis of the political reliability prong of the law, the
German bar associations began a purge of their membership by expelling "politi-
cal undesirables," Jews, and women. 107 New bar regulations prohibited Aryan
attorneys from entering into partnership arrangements with the remaining Jewish
attorneys. 10 8 The economic and professional segregation of Jewish lawyers from
their Aryan colleagues was made complete by the Law on Abuse of Legal Services
of December 1935, which required Aryan attorneys to dissolve all business ar-
rangements with Jews by April 1, 1936.109 This law had a major impact upon
many disbarred Jewish attorneys who had worked as legal advisors to Aryan attor-
neys at reduced rates. 110 Finally, on November 30, 1938, the licenses of all re-
maining Jewish lawyers were revoked by the Fifth Decree Supplementing the Reich
Citizenship Law of September 27, 1938.111 This law allowed a small number of
former Jewish attorneys to practice as "consultants," who could only advise Jews
or Jewish concerns. 112
2. Structural Reorganization
At the direction of the Nazi German Jurists Association, the National Bar As-
sociation was replaced by the more official National Lawyers' Chamber in 1935.113
The formerly self-governing regional bar associations were replaced by regional
chambers, which were under the supervision of the national chamber and attached
to the respective state courts of appeal. 114 The officers of both the national and the
regional chambers were appointed by the Ministry of Justice after consultation
with the head of the Nazi German Jurists Association. 115
This reorganization led to the creation of the Legal Social Honor Court sys-
tem, with lower courts at the regional chamber level, and an appeals court at the
national level. 116 In contrast to the old professional discipline system in which a
104. See AMERICAN JEwIsH CoMMrrrEa, supra note 63, at 139-40.
105. See id at 149-50.
106. See Reifner, supra note 76, at 117.
107. See Racial Barriers In Berlin-New Rules For Lawyers, TimES (London), Jul. 5, 1933, at
13; 'Aryan'Lawyers Forbidden to have Connections with Jews, N.Y. TIMEs, Jul. 1, 1933, at 16.
108. See Reich Bar Closed to Jews, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 11, 1936, at 4. Certain exceptions were
permitted, however. In the important commercial port of Hamburg, for example, those firms
with an extensive commercial practice were not required to comply with this law. See Reifner,
supra note 76, at 118.
109. See Reifner, supra note 76, at 119.
110. See id.
I 11. See I THE HOLOCAUST 146-55 (J. Mendelsohn ed. 1982). This Act was supplemented by
a special decree on November 3, 1938, which barred all Jewish patent attorneys from practice
after November 30, 1938. Jewish Patent Attorneys Barred, N.Y. Tiums, Nov. 4, 1938, at 4.
112. See THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 111, at 146-55. Interestingly, the average income of a
German lawyer only rose from 9,940 reichsmark in 1933 to 10,849 reichsmark in 1939, despite
the greater legal monopoly granted by the Nazi government and a 24 percent reduction in the
number of practicing attorneys during that time period. See Reifner, supra note 76, at 121.
113. See Willig, supra note 101, at 6.
114. See id.
115. See id
116. See il at 7.
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special senate of the Supreme Court heard disbarment actions,117 the lower courts
were given the power to fine, suspend, and even disbar attorneys. 118 New stan-
dards of professional behavior were promulgated to complement the new disci-
plinary mechanisms. For example, disciplinary actions were brought against at-
torneys who criticized judges or laws, 119 or who neglected to demonstrate the
proper political attitude through failure to give the Hitler salute. 120
Disbarment and acts such as the bringing of"spurious" claims before the honor
courts carried with them the threat of future criminal proceedings against the indi-
viduals involved. 121 In 1936, a Jewish lawyer complained to a regional bar cham-
ber about the insulting courtroom manner of one of its members, an opposing Nazi
counsel who had sought to have the Jewish lawyer excluded from court on "racial
grounds." A Magdeburg court sentenced the Jewish lawyer to one month's con-
finement, holding that the question was wholly one of general principle, and not
personal libel. The Jewish attorney's complaint against the "deserving party mem-
ber" was therefore unfounded, and as such, it called for severe punishment. 122
3. Impediments to Practice
Jewish attorneys remained prominent targets of SA terrorism even after pas-
sage of the Bar Reorganization Law,123 and often found themselves ridiculed by
the Nazi media.124 The Nazi German Jurists Association also acted through the
Nazi media to publicly harass the clients of Jewish attorneys. For example, the
names of people who had not been ashamed to use the services of Jewish lawyers
were published in the August 28, 1933 edition of Die Hessische Volkswacht by the
head of the Kassel branch of the Nazi German Jurists Association. 125
Clients who continued to use Jewish lawyers met with a cool reception in
many courts. For example, successful parties were often denied attorneys' costs if
they had been represented by Jewish lawyers. 126 Further, many courts declined to
recognize the exempt status of the remaining Jewish attorneys, and refused to al-
low these attorneys to practice before them.127 Aryan clients in particular met
with unexpectedly harsh results when represented by Jewish attorneys. On Febru-
ary 4, 1936, a social honor court sitting in Harburg-Wilhelmsburg refused to "give
the usual consideration" to a Jewish attorney's request that he be allowed to plead
for his Aryan client. The court also enjoined the defendant from acting in any
executive capacity in the future, because he had "failed to think like a National-
117. See id.
118. See id
119. See Reifuer, supra note 76, at 112.
120. See Willig, supra note 101, at 8.
121. See iU.
122. Reich Jails Lawyer Resenting Race Slur, N.Y. Tums, Jan. 17, 1936, at 3.
123. A prominent Jewish attorney in Chemnitz, for example, was kidnapped from his home
on April 10, 1933, by men in Nazi uniforms. His body was found the next day along a country
road. Officially, the police suspected the culprits to have been "disguised anti-Nazis." Promi-
nent Jewish Lawyer Slain, N.Y. Tnams, Apr. 12, 1933, at 6.
124. See Reifner, supra note 76, at 107-08.
125. See Nazis Hit at Jewish Lawyers, N.Y. TwEs, Aug. 29, 1933, at 4.
126. See Reifoer, supra note 76, at 118.
127. See LU m, supra note 42, at 271-72.
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Socialist or show due respect for racial principles" by appearing in court with a
Jewish attorney. 128
E. The League ofNations AdministeredAreas
Under the Treaty of Versailles following World War I, many areas of the former
German Empire were removed, either fully or in part, from the jurisdiction of the
new German Republic. Some countries, such as Poland, France, and Belgium,
received German territory outright. 12 9 On the new German borders, certain small
enclaves were established under the auspices of the League of Nations, which it-
self had been created by the Treaty of Versailles. 130 These areas, specifically the
Saar, Upper Silesia, and Danzig, were placed under varying degrees of supervision
by the League of Nations, and were given different international administrative
and legal regimes to complement the existing or newly created domestic systems
of government. The reasons for the creation of these enclaves varied widely. In
the case of the Saar, the League of Nations' trusteeship was a means by which
France assumed control of the regions' rich coal mines as a partial reparation for
the damage done to captured French coal mines under German occupation during
the war. 131 In Upper Silesia, the League of Nations played a less direct role in the
administration of the region, and focused upon the protection of minority rights in
that rich mining and industrial district during a transition period to full German
and Polish sovereignty in their respective parts of the region. 132 Danzig, with its
excellent harbor, was made a nearly autonomous city-state in order to allow Po-
land a non-German outlet to the Baltic Sea without putting a large, concentrated
population of Germans under Polish rule. 13 3 The populations of these areas re-
mained ethnically and politically German in large part, and were therefore strongly
influenced by events in Germany, including the rise of the Nazi Party. Because of
the availability of international fora, rather than just domestic German courts, how-
ever, the results of the Jewish legal response to Nazi persecution in these areas
were for a time quite different from the results obtained in the rest of Germany.
M11. THE GERMAN JEWISH LEGAL RESPONSE
A. Labor Law
The field of labor law was among the first areas of German jurisprudence to
experience the effect of anti-Jewish litigation. Because of the gradual nature of
Nazi employment restrictions, and the extensive scope of the field itself, Jewish
litigation involving labor relations continued into the early part of World War 11. 134
128. Reich Court Bans Jew, N.Y. TimmE, Feb. 5, 1935, at 7.
129. See RICHARD M. WATT, THE KINGS DEPART: THE TRAGEDY OF GERMANY: VERSAILLES AND
THE GERMAN REVOLUTION (1968).
130. See id. at 59-62.
131. See id. at 90-97.
132. See GEORGES KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA: A STUDY
IN THE WORKING OF THE UPPER SILESIAN SErnlmENT 1922-1937, at 25 (1942).
133. See WATT, supra note 129, at 346, 361.
134. For the organizing concept of this subsection, I am indebted to Professor Marc Linder
for his thorough treatment of the German Jewish legal response in his fine study on the Supreme
Labor Court. See LINDER, supra note 42.
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1. Civil Service Law Phase, April 1933-September 1935
a. Trial Courts
Whether it was applicable or not, Jewish plaintiffs appear to have had little
success in the labor trial courts after the promulgation of the Civil Service Law. In
a rare example of organized Jewish litigation, fifty Jews who had been dismissed
from Nazi controlled industries and businesses without notice brought suit against
their former employers. On May 5, 1933, a Berlin labor court held that the firms in
question were entitled to dismiss Jewish employees without notice. 135 Although it
is unclear from the report, these dismissals were either based on the Civil Service
Law prohibition against non-Aryan "indirect" officials, or the "spirit" of the law as
applied to private firms. If the former is true, it is unlikely that the court ever
reached the merits of the case, because of the no-appeal provision of the Civil
Service Law. In other early cases, private dismissals were upheld on grounds of
impossibility of cooperation between a Jewish employee and a newly "coordi-
nated" physician's organization; 136 and the possible economic destruction of a
pharmacy by means of a professional boycott unless the Jewish employee was
dismissed. 137 Interestingly, in 1934, a Wuerzburg trial court was presented with a
case in which both parties were orthodox Jews. The plaintiff-employee's appren-
ticeship contract was dissolved as a result of the boycott of the employer's store
and its subsequent sale to a non-Jew. The court found the dismissal justified on
grounds that the employer could not be expected to continue in an unprofitable
business merely to benefit the plaintiff. 138
b. Appeals Courts
Jewish litigants often met with more success at the court of appeals level dur-
ing this time period, however. In fact, in a decision issued by a Dortmund Labor
Court of Appeal, Nazi ideology was used to reach an outcome favorable to the
Jewish litigant. The appellant, a supervisor in a department store, was discharged
by his employer without notice in April 1933, and subsequently sued for six months'
salary. The court first noted that renunciation of a contract without notice could
only be justified if observing the contract's terms would constitute sabotage of the
national revolution. The possibility that the employer might suffer inconvenience
and some financial loss did not meet this standard, especially since neither the law
nor government policy appeared to require such action by the employer. The court
also noted that the commercial expansion of department stores historically had
been at the expense of other independent businesses, without regard for the nega-
tive effects such activity had on the public welfare. Accordingly, it was a policy of
135. See Right of Nazis to Oust Jewsfrom Jobs Upheld by Court, N.Y. Tms, May 6, 1933, at
8. Possibly another exception to the general lack of organized litigation is the legal bureau
opened by the Central Federation of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith to provide legal advice
to Jews with regard to Nazi actions. See Guido Enderis, Nazis Press Policy on Racial Purging,
N.Y. TmTms, Mar. 18, 1933, at 6.
136. See LumEn, supra note 42, at 258.
137. See id.
138. See id at 259.
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the Nazi Party to limit such businesses; a policy which would not be bolstered by
letting department stores burden the welfare system of the state by discharging
employees in this fashion. 139 In areas where the Nazi Party was seeking to restrict
Jewish employment, however, Nazi ideology was applied in the fashion the Party
desired. In late 1933, a Prussian Labor Court of Appeal approved the summary
dismissal of a Jewish movie director, basing its decision upon speeches by Chan-
cellor Hitler and Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels that dealt with the need to
repress Jewish influence in German culture. 140
Several early appellate cases even held that employers were under an obliga-
tion to resist outside pressure to dismiss Jewish employees without notice when
such actions were mandated neither by statute nor by Nazi-inspired general
clauses. 141 In one case, a defendant-employer who was an SA reservist was or-
dered by the SA to discharge the Jewish plaintiff without notice. In 1934, the
Darmstadt Labor Court of Appeal overturned the trial court's finding that it was
incompetent to review the order, holding instead that the government's efforts to
restrain such actions in the sphere of private enterprise authorized review of the
order. 142
By 1935, intermediate appellate decisions began to reflect an ever increasing
reliance on Nazi ideology. Terminated by her employer with notice in 1935 be-
cause the local Nazi organization threatened a boycott, a Jew brought suit in the
Wiesbaden Labor District Court for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff argued that
no law required the dismissal of Jews from private employment, and that the Nazi
Party's action was an unjustified interference in private business. The court found
the dismissal to be legal, because it had been motivated by the need to protect
"against loss of business." 14 3 The lower court's decision was affirmed by the
Frankfurt Labor Court of Appeal. With regard to appellant's argument that her
dismissal was void as contra bonos mores, the appellate court held that under the
current conception of bonos mores, dismissal of a Jewish employee by her Chris-
tian employer so as to hire an unemployed "Christian Volk-comrade" would not be
considered unconscionable. 14 4 Similarly, the dismissal of a Jewish kindergarten
teacher was upheld on the basis that it was no longer acceptable for a female non-
Aryan to watch over Aryan children in a kindergarten. 145
c. Supreme Court
The first case to come before the Supreme Labor Court after the promulgation
of the Civil Service Law involved not a civil servant, but instead a store manager
who was dismissed without notice by his private employer. At issue "was whether
[the] plaintiff's Jewishness was an important cause for immediate dismissal within
the meaning of" section 626 of the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code). 14 6
139. See id. at 260-61.
140. See Oustings of Jews Curbed by Seldie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1934, at 28.
141. See LINDER, supra note 42.
142. See id. at 261.
143. See AMERICAN JEWISH CoMMrrrEE, supra note 63, at 54-55.
144. See LINDER, supra note 42, at 261-62.
145. See id. at 262. This decision was handed down just four days before the Nuremberg
Laws went into effect. See id.
146. See id. at 254 n.39. Section 626 allowed either party to terminate an employment
relationship without notice for an important cause. See id.
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The Court held that an employee's Jewishness could constitute a cause for dis-
missal, but that this was not a per se rule. Because the employer had not proven
that he would suffer actual or potential economic damage as a result of retaining
the appellant for the contractual period of notice, and because of the high regard
that the store's customers had for the appellant, the Court held that the employer
was required to give the appellant notice before dismissal. The Court also noted
that despite the current situation in Germany, the personal relationship between
the parties might justify maintaining the contractual relationship even at the risk of
the employer incurring financial hardship. 147
In another dismissal-without-notice case before it the next month, the Supreme
Labor Court remanded the case to a lower court to determine whether the employer's
fear of harm resulting from observing the required notice period had an objective
basis, or whether the employer had instead acted upon mere subjective conjecture
in terminating a Jewish employee. The Court noted that the lack of anti-Jewish
laws in the private sector precluded employers from discharging employees solely
because they were Jewish, but that the current "clarified" views with regard to
Jewry were factors to be considered in deciding such cases.148 This point in the
devolution of German law under the Third Reich is very significant, for it serves as
a benchmark in the application of normative legal concepts to cases involving
Jews. When a branch of the German Supreme Court decides that personal charac-
teristics of a plaintiff are a factor to be considered in deciding whether an action
against a plaintiff is proper, it represents a turning point in the course of the entire
legal system. The next likely step in this devolution becomes apparent: Jewishness
is no longer just a factor, but is instead the predominate factor upon which adjudi-
cation of a case is based. As will be seen below in the discussion of the various
League of Nations legal systems, this point serves as an objective tool by which to
measure the continued application of normative legal concepts in the respective
systems.
Interestingly, Jewishness was not held to be a factor in all cases, however. In
December 1934, the Supreme Labor Court decided a case in which both the em-
ployee-appellant and the employer-appellee were Jewish. The appellant had been
dismissed without notice upon the urging of local Nazi Party officials. Although
the Court noted that the officials' actions were illegal, it also held that the risk of
economic harm to the firm as a whole that might result from appellant's continued
employment could justify his dismissal. The case was remanded for findings as to
whether the employer had made reasonable efforts to determine whether there was
objective evidence of the possibility of harm. 149
2. The Nuremberg Laws Phase, September 1935-November 1938
a. Appeals Courts
The so-called Nuremberg Laws of 1935 excluded Jews from public or quasi-
public employment, but not from private businesses operated for profit. 150 This
147. See id. at 253-54.
148. See also JANOWSKY & FAGa-, supra note 84, at 216 n.63; Oustings ofJews Curbed by
Seldie, supra note 140, at 28.
149. See LnwDER, supra note 42, at 256-57.
150. See Curbs Discharge of Jews, N.Y. Tuais, Nov. 28. 1935, at 25.
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statutory distinction was frequently without effect in practice, for many private
concerns used the spirit of the Nuremberg Laws as a pretext for dismissing Jewish
employees. Accordingly, the labor courts increasingly upheld very subjective and
functional justifications for the dismissal of Jewish employees. On February 14,
1936, the Weimar Labor Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a private Jewish
employee on the basis of the Nazi Party policy of seeking to bring about a separa-
tion of Jews and Aryans in the same business and in economic life in general, and
to especially prevent Jews from being in a position of authority of influence over
Aryans. The court noted that it was not its role to render a decision in opposition
to what the Nazi Party and its subordinate organizations had determined was cor-
rect.15 1
In a case in which the Jewish plaintiff had been dismissed from his job as a
technical laboratory assistant at a university, the Breslau Labor Court of Appeal
agreed with the plaintiff that the Nuremberg Laws did not require the discharge of
non-Aryans in public, non-tenured positions. Despite this acknowledgment, the
Court held that public employers, as role models for private enterprises, by neces-
sity must conduct their affairs in accordance with Nazi principles. Accordingly, an
explicit statutory mandate was unnecessary in this case.152 Many dismissals of
Jewish employees were upheld when their continued employment was found to be
contrary to the employers' best interests. 153 One court went so far as to find that
the dismissal of two Jewish employees was in the interest of both parties, for this
would allow their migration to non-Aryan concerns, and vice versa. 154
b. Supreme Court
Even after the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws, the Supreme Labor Court
continued to hold that non-Aryan employees could not be discharged from private
employment without compensation merely because they were non-Aryan. In a
decision on November 28, 1935, the Court held that if the discharge involved is-
sues of "truth and loyalty," however, the Court would then determine whether com-
pensation was required. 155
The eventual denial of traditional judicial protection for German Jews was
foreshadowed by a Supreme Court decision on June 27, 1936. In February 1933,
a Jewish playwright and director signed a contract with a large German film com-
pany to direct a film. The contract provided for the termination of the relationship
only in the event of "sickness, death, or similar causes rendering the stage manager's
work impossible." 156 After the Nazi Party came to power in 1933, the company
15 1. See New Nazi Action Against Jews-Race As Reason For Dismissal, Tua (London),
Feb. 15, 1936, at 11.
152. See LINDER, supra note 42, at 271.
153. A Saalfeld District Labor Court, for example, upheld a textile firm's dismissal of a
Jewish employee in response to a Nazi Party threat to withdraw its patronage. The court found
the dismissal justified on grounds that retention of Jewish employees would result in financial
hardship and a loss of Nazi Party confidence in their employers. See THE DuAL STATE, supra
note 70, at 92 n.285.
154. See id at 92, n.286.
155. See Curbs Discharge of Jews, supra note 150.
156. Marlene Dietrich Denounced By Nazi, N.Y. Tim s, Oct. 7, 1937, at 31.
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abrogated the contract and refused to pay the director his salary. 157 The director
brought suit against the film company, and the case eventually wound its way to
the Supreme Labor Court. The Court dismissed the complaint, holding that:
[The former (liberal) theory of the legal status of the "person" made no distinc-
tion between races .... The National-Socialist philosophy, however, requires
that German law recognize only persons of German origin or those who by law
are declared equal to them and that only Aryans should enjoy all legal rights and
privileges. It is merely a renewal of old principles to distinguish between groups
having all legal rights and those who have only a limited number of rights. The
complete deprivation of all rights is described as a 'civil' death: the case before
this court permits an analogy. Since the contract in this case could be dissolved
only if 'sickness, death, etc.' prevented the plaintiff from fulfilling his obliga-
tions the analogy to 'civil death' is regarded as unqualifiedly applicable because
the racial characteristics of the plaintiff were equated with sickness and death.158
In another decision the same day, however, the Supreme Labor Court found
for the Jewish plaintiff, a traveling salesman employed by a firm which had been
sold by its former Jewish owners under Nazi pressure. The salesman gave notice
after the firm had sought to reduce his compensation. During the notice period,
and after the Nuremberg Laws were enacted, the salesman was discharged without
notice because he refused to work solely for commissions or to restrict his busi-
ness solicitations to Jewish firms. The Court found that while it was true that most
Aryan firms no longer received Jewish salesmen, this had been the case for some
time before the firm had attempted to renegotiate the appellant's contract. By
choosing not to discharge appellant on that basis then, the firm was foreclosed
from using it as a justification for dismissal without notice later. The Court re-
jected the firm's argument that the Nuremberg Laws had an affect on this case.
The Court concluded that it had failed to raise the issue before the lower courts and
that the firm had been obligated to examine the validity of appellant's continued
employment long before those laws were enacted. 159
Later that year, the Supreme Labor Court was presented with the opportunity
to interpret the Nuremberg Laws in a case involving a collective bargaining agree-
ment which the dismissed Jewish appellant had entered into in 1929. Under the
terms of the agreement, non-German permanent employees could be deprived of
their pensions if discharged, despite having accumulated as much as ten years se-
niority. The Duesseldorf Labor Court of Appeal found for the employer, on grounds
that appellant was no longer a German citizen under the Nuremberg Laws. 160 The
Supreme Labor Court reversed, finding that the distinction those laws made be-
tween German citizens and German nationals had not existed at the time the agree-
ment had been entered into, and that the purpose of the provision was to cause non-
157. See id.
158. THE DuAL STATE, supra note 70, at 95-96 (quoting the Reichsgericlu). The German
company had contracted with a Swiss firm to produce the film, and had made an advance pay-
ment of 130,000 reichsmark. The contract was to be voided if the director died or was incapaci-
tated. After the German Supreme Court's decision in its favor, the German company sued for a
refund of the advance payment. In October 1937, the Swiss Supreme Court held the German
decision was without effect in Switzerland, and that the Swiss firm was therefore not required to
refund the advance payment. See Marlene Dietrich Denounced By Nazi, supra note 157.
159. See LwtDm, supra note 42, at 264.
160. See id.
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Germans to seek a remedy from their own governments. Accordingly, the Court
found the distinction to be meaningless, because German Jews were not prohibited
from receiving pensions. 161
A permanent municipal employee, who had fought in the front lines in World
War I, contested the validity of his dismissal without notice, an event which would
preclude him from receiving both pre- and post-retirement age compensation. The
Cologne Labor Court otAppeal held that it was reasonable for the employer to
meet the termination period requirements. 162 The Supreme Labor Court remanded
the case back to the lower court for consideration of the employer's allegation that
public unrest had occurred because of the employee's continued employment. 163
The lower court again found for the employee, holding that in light of his long and
loyal service, the willingness of his co-workers to continue to work with him, the
singular nature of the event alleged by the employer, and the unusually harsh con-
sequences of discharge without notice in this case, the incident did not constitute
an important cause justifying dismissal without notice. The Supreme Labor Court
affirmed the lower court's decision, on grounds that it could not overturn that court's
factual findings as a matter of law. 164
In the summer of 1937, the Supreme Labor Court held in favor of a Jewish
traveling salesman who had been terminated by his employer when it was discov-
ered that he was Jewish. In response to the appellee's advertisement, the appellant
had agreed to work as an independent agent selling a line of fur coats. Upon being
notified that appellant was Jewish, the firm terminated his contract and returned
his orders to him unfilled and without compensation. The appellant subsequently
sued for the outstanding commissions on the orders. The Supreme Labor Court
affirmed the lower courts' decisions in favor of the salesman, finding that the ap-
pellant could not have known under the circumstances that the firm did not wish to
hire Jews; and that, although Aryans were to be hired before Jews, Jews could still
assume they could be hired. 165
As late as 1938, the Supreme Labor Court reversed a lower court's decision in
favor of an employer who had refused to grant a widow a pension because she was
Jewish and because the promise to pay her the pension had been in the form of a
non-binding gift. The Court found both of these reasons to be invalid. 16 6 In a case
involving the interpretation of the Nuremberg Laws two months later, however,
the Court found that because the decrees made pursuant to the statutes were clearly
intended to discriminate against Jewish supervisory doctors in public hospitals
with regard to pension entitlements, equitable considerations were inapplicable
even in cases involving special hardships. 167
161. See id. Although the employer attempted to discharge the appellant again the next year,
the Supreme Labor Court upheld the Duesseldorf Court of Appeal's decision invalidating the
discharge. See id. at 264-65.
162. See id. at 265.
163. See id.
164. See id. Interestingly, in March 1937, the Supreme Labor Court had upheld the dismissal
without notice of a front-line veteran who was a municipal employee, noting the duty of local
governments to foster Nazi ideas. See id. at 265-66.
165. See id. at 267-68.
166. See id. at 270.
167. See id.
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3. The Decree Pertaining to the Elimination of Jews from German Economic Life
Phase, November 1938-September 1941
Soon after the Nazi coalition government came to power in January 1933,
Jewish businesses were increasingly pressured to sell out to Aryan firms. Such
buy-outs, termed "Aryanizations," 168 were usually accomplished at bargain
prices, 169 for the targeted Jewish firms generally had little choice in the course of
these transactions. 170 Jews were also subject to increasing commercial restric-
tions through the later 1930s, 17 1 but comprehensive prohibitions on Jewish eco-
nomic activity were not enacted until after the Kristallnacht pogrom in November
1938. The subsequent Decree Pertaining to the Elimination of Jews from German
Economic Life (Economic Elimination Decree) and the regulations which followed
it prevented Jews from working in the majority of business areas which were still
available to them, and denied many of those rendered unemployed pension or sig-
nificant welfare payments. 172 These measures, in conjunction with the post-
Kristallnacht punitive tax on Jews, allowed for the almost complete expropriation
of remaining Jewish assets through Aryanization or thinly veiled confiscation, and
foreshadowed the annihilation of the Jews themselves in the coming Holocaust.
A review of Supreme Labor Court decisions during this period reveals that
Nazi ideology had become firmly ensconced in German jurisprudence by this time
even at this highest level. In July 1939, in a case involving three Jewish appren-
tices who had had their contracts terminated by the new owner of their Aryanized
plant, the Court held that economic harm to the enterprise was no longer the pri-
mary factor in determining whether an employer was justified in terminating con-
tracts without notice when unforeseen circumstances arose. Rather, in light of the
socially recognized significance of the concept of race, Nazi racial principles were
now the most important factor in such determinations. 173
With regard to the proper interpretation of anti-Jewish laws, the Supreme La-
bor Court held in early 1940 that they were no longer to be strictly construed as
exceptional measures. They were instead to be viewed as systems implementing
certain aspects of the Nazi Party's program, which was constitutional in nature. 174
However, in another pension reduction case the next month, the Supreme Labor
Court clarified its holding by finding that "the Jew still participates in general
legal intercourse," in the absence of statutes specifically prohibiting such action.
In this case, the Court found that despite her Jewishness, the plaintiff was entitled
168. See HI-BERG, supra note 61, at 95.
169. See id at 133.
170. See id. at 95. See generally RAm. HiLBERG, DOCUNENTS OF DEsmucrioN 26-29 (1971),
for a translation of an Aryanization contract.
171. See LiNDEi, supra note 42, at 249 nn.20, 21.
172. See id at n.23. See generally ARAD, supra note 79, at 115-16 for a translation of the
regulations. Govemnent assistance was granted only in situations where Jewish welfare agen-
cies were unable to provide support, and only under very stringent conditions. See Luwm,
supra note 42, at 249 n.24.
173. See id at 274. During the same month, however, in the first case decided under the
economic elimination decree, the court held that the defendant's contractual obligation to pay a
pension to a Jewish employee was unaffected by the decree. See id. at 275.
174. See id at 277-78. The court noted that the economic elimination decree was not in-
tended to be punitive, rather only to effect the segregation of Jews and Aryans. See id.
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to an "adequate" pension from her former employer. 175 As a result of the Nazi
government's discriminatory wage policy which denied certain payments to Jew-
ish workers, 17 6 several German firms refused to pay wages to Jewish workers for
legal holidays in late 1939.177 Suits brought by Jewish workers were initially
successful at trial, but were resolved inconsistently at the appellate level. The
Koblenz Labor Court of Appeal overturned a trial court decision in favor of the
Jewish plaintiff, holding that because the holidays were political in nature, and
Jews could not participate in this aspect of the political process, they were not
entitled to the benefit of the holidays. 178 Three months later, however, a Berlin
Labor Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial court granting a Jewish
demolition worker holiday pay, finding the legislative silence on the issue indica-
tive of the drafters' intent not to make racial or other distinctions in the applicabil-
ity of the holidays. 179
Although the Berlin court did not allow an appeal to be taken in this case, the
Supreme Labor Court decided two similar cases in July 1940.180 The Court held
that because they were racially predisposed to promote personal interests and to
attain economic advantages, Jews were outside the German labor community.
Accordingly, when the state made an exception to the principle that wages were
paid only for work actually performed, only those within the community (Aryans)
were to benefit. 18 1
One of the last Supreme Labor Court cases involving Jewish litigants shows
all too clearly that by early 1941, Jews could no longer expect to receive any nor-
mative treatment before German courts. A Jewish laborer was discharged in the
middle of a work day, and contrary to the pertinent construction industry regula-
tions, was given neither the full day's wages nor the requisite amount of severance
pay. The workman sued for these amounts, but the trial court found that public law
applied by virtue of the plaintiff's employment being controlled by the local em-
ployment office; and, as a matter of public law, such payments were not required.
The appeals court, however, recognized that the workman was one of several non-
local individuals on the particular work crew who had not been under the supervi-
sion of the local employment office, and had allegedly been discharged because
the employment office only intended to hire local Jews in a public-law obligatory
relationship. Accordingly, the appeals court held that private law applied to the
case. The Supreme Labor Court reversed, accepting the municipality's argument
that considerations of state security, namely, the segregation and supervision of
Jewish workers, were controlling. 182 This finding was not based on any statutory
authority, instead the Court held that this was a "special case.., which in view of
175. See id. at 279.
176. See LIUNDE supra note 42.
177. See HI1BERG, supra note 61, at 99.
178. See LNDE, supra note 42, at 279-80.
179. See id. at 280.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 281. Similarly, a Kassel labor court found the withholding of holiday pay
proper because Jews had "no inner tie" to the performance of labor and regarded it only as a
commodity. The court found the withholding also justified on grounds that Jews had no loyalty
to their employers. See HILBERG, supra note 61, at 99.
182. See id. at 282.
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its element of state and racial politics must follow its own legal rules, which if
necessary, must be inferred from law in the making." 183 Ironically, ordinary (as
opposed to slave) Jewish labor was in demand during the early part of World War
II due to labor shortages. Because Jewish employees had a clearly inferior status
by this time, however, the labor courts were no longer deemed necessary to resolve
conflicts involving Jewish workers. Special judges were assigned to such cases,
and their decisions were not subject to appeal. 184
B. Conunerce
The Nazi boycott severely disrupted Jewish commerce, and legal efforts to
abate its effects were not particularly successful. In 1935, for example, the Jewish
owner of a driving school attempted to obtain an injunction restraining the local
Nazi Party organization from continuing to post on a wall near the petitioner's
place of business a list of Jewish concerns to be boycotted, among which was the
name of petitioner's business. The Municipal Court of Eberwalde denied the peti-
tion, holding that in light of the "prevailing conditions in Germany, every German
had a right to learn whether or not a firm was Jewish." 185
Although the boycott accentuated the pressure on Jewish businesses to Aryanize
quickly, the exact way in which Aryanization was to occur became the subject of
considerable conflict within the Nazi government at the policy level. The Ministry
of Economics preferred to keep the expropriation process orderly, so as to mini-
mize the loss of Jewish entrepreneurial talent, which it viewed as essential for the
proper functioning of the German economy.186 Conversely, the Nazi Party had
little regard for Jews, commercially skilled or not, and sought to eliminate all Jew-
ish influence in the German economy as quickly as possible.
In the early years of the Third Reich, Aryanization could sometimes be ac-
complished on terms not entirely unfavorable to the Jewish owner. One such
Aryanized business in which the former Jewish owner apparently retained some
degree of control was the Tietz department store chain, which became the Aryanized
Westdeutsche Kaufhof, A.G., of Cologne. In August 1934, an article in the Nazi
newspaper Der Westdeutsche Beobachter warned its readers not to buy from the
firm's stores because it was a "Jew shop in disguise." The firm sought an injunc-
tion, arguing that there were no longer any non-Aryan directors, and although the
former owner had been retained as the general manager, this was with the consent
of banks controlled by the Nazi government (which may have financed the
Aryanization). The newspaper justified its actions on the grounds that the Nazi
Party had not given up the fight against Jews, even though the Nazi government
had prohibited certain actions against department stores. The court deferred judg-
ment. 187
183. See id
184. See WuN,Dmumc, supra note 35, at 232 n.109.
185. JAowsKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 205.
186. See id at 22. See also ARAD, supra note 79, at 73-75, for a translation of the minutes of
the August 20, 1935, cabinet meeting, in which the Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht,
details the problems experienced by his ministry in the wake of anti-Jewish violence, and the
pragmatic considerations which affected the Ministry of Economics' policy toward Jews.
187. See Multiple Stores In German)--Suit Against Newspaper, Tnms (London), Aug. 15,
1934, at 9.
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Jewish businesses were also pressured to Aryanize by the application of dis-
criminatory commercial regulations. For example, non-Aryan firms were not al-
lowed to accept relief vouchers and were excluded from receiving public con-
tracts. 188 Sensitive to the negative effect that extensive restrictions on Jewish
commerce might have on the recovering German economy, however, the Nazi gov-
ernment often restrained the scope of anti-Jewish measures in this area. For ex-
ample, even though Jewish lawyers were no longer allowed to be partners with
Aryan practitioners as of July 1933, certain firms in Hamburg, the major German
port city, were exempted from this requirement if they had a large commercial
practice. 189 Accordingly, German courts continued to grant Jewish businesses a
measure of normative protection for a significant length of time. In 1935, the
Cologne Administrative District Court upheld a restraint on Jewish commerce,
finding it justified by Nazi economic theory with regard to the dishonesty of Jew-
ish merchants. Noting that the theory expressed the "general conviction of the
nations," the court held that "official bodies must respect it." 19 0 This decision was
reversed by the Prussian Court of Appeal, which held that Jews were to be dealt
with according to the law in order to protect the principle of entrepreneurial free-
dom. 19 1
Litigation under the Law Governing Unfair Competition192 demonstrates how,
when apparently convenient to further Nazi aims, legal interpretations which fa-
vored Jews might still be rendered. As early as 1934, the Supreme Court held that
use of a company name which did not clearly indicate the "non-Aryan" origin of
the owners constituted unfair competition. 193 Similarly, the Prussian Court of Ap-
peals held in 1935 that a firm owned by Jews or employing Jews had no right to
call itself a "German business," and that it would be unfair competition for such a
firm not to include that information in its advertising. 194 In 1936, however, in a
case involving the economically important insurance industry, the Supreme Court
found the circulation of a list of the directors of a firm whose names appeared to be
Jewish by one of its competitors to be illegal. The Court held that "[t]o refer to the
Jewish character of a firm is to adduce facts which are totally irrelevant to the
commercial merits of an insurance company.... Nor can the defendant claim that
the National-Socialist philosophy requires the protection of the rural population
from Jewish influences." 195
By 1937, however, the economists had lost their fight with the Nazi Party over
control of the economy, a result which spelled even quicker ruin for the remaining
Jewish enterprises. In one case, upon the dissolution of a partnership, a Jewish
businessman requested his Aryan partner to provide him with monthly reports, as
was the Jewish partner's right by law. When the Aryan refused, the Jewish partner
brought him to court. The defendant argued that his actions could not constitute
188. See JANOWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 179.
189. See Reifner, supra note 76, at 117-18.
190. THE DUAL STATE, supra note 70, at 90 n.278.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 89.
193. See JANOWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 206-07.
194. See id.
195. THE DUAL STATE, supra note 70, at 89-90 (quoting JANKoWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at
206-07). The court overruled its own decision in February 1939. See id. at n.276.
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grounds for a judgment against him because the Nazi Party had forbidden him to
communicate with the plaintiff. The court found for the defendant. 196
Even actions as seemingly non-political as a recovery upon a debt became
risky for Jewish businessmen. In 1937, a Jewish merchant in Berlin brought suit
against a Nazi Party member to recover payments for goods that the member's
wife had bought on credit. In August 1937, a German court held that because at
the time the purchases were made that it was recognized as unseemly for Germans
to buy from Jews, the husband could not possibly be bound by the contract. 197
Beyond the risk of not being able to recover upon a debt, the bringing of such a suit
could even give rise to an action against the Jewish plaintiff. As early as June
1935, the Court of Appeals of Marienwerder held that a cause of action for slander
would lie against a Jewish merchant who alleged that a prominent Nazi had bought
an overcoat at his shop, if it was proven that the merchant actually made the state-
ment.198
C. Property
The supposed bond between the German peasantry and the land was a concept
of major importance in Nazi ideology. 199 An early Nazi decree gave this concept
effect by restricting the inheritance of farmland to farmers who could prove they
had no Jewish ancestors back to 1800.200 Although Jews were not expressly pro-
hibited from owning other types of real estate until 1938,201 in 1933 a Rostock
court upheld the decision of a lower court forbidding the sale of a parcel of land to
a Jew. The court held that the Nazi Party program was valid law, and according to
it a Jew could not buy land because only Germans by blood should be owners of
German soil.202 In line with this reasoning, on January 5, 1935, the Nuremberg
Court of Appeals refused to compel an Aryan debtor to satisfy an uncontested debt
to a foreign Jew. The court held that:
According to the actual purified conception of the law, a debtor is entitled to
refuse the execution of an obligation even if the performance thereof is contrary
neither to law nor to morals, but yet would have the effect of bringing parts of the
national property, especially real property, into the hands of a "non-Aryan" for-
eigner, thereby harming the national community.20 3
The official Nazi policy of forcing German Jewish emigration during the early
years of the Third Reich had the indirect result of transferring large amounts of
Jewish money to the state. As of 1931, everyone emigrating from Germany was
196. See i at9l.
197. Wife's Debt To Jew Not Recoverable-German Court Ruling, TmEs (London), Aug.20,
1937, at 9.
198. See JANOWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 205.
199. See ADOLF HrnER, MEIN KAmpi 138, 390, 652 (1925).
200. The law's operation is described in Lucy S. Dvmowicz, THE WAR AGAINsTr mE JEws
1933-1945. The first decree for the execution of this law restricted Jews from acting as judges
of inheritance courts and from appearing as attorneys before such courts. See AMusucAN JEwtsH
CoM.nrrr, supra note 63, at 87-88.
201. See THE JE wSH BLACK BOOK coiliwrmE, THE B.ACK BooK 106 (1981).
202. See Burgomaster of Berlin-Expulsion from Nazi Party. TwEs (London), Nov. 25. 1935,
at 13.
203. JANowSKIY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 208 (citing Deutsche Justiz at 403 (June 29,
1935)).
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required to pay a special emigration tax, unless the emigration was in the best
interests of the German people or the German economy.204 Certain Jews brought
suit to have the emigration tax declared inapplicable to them on the basis of this
exemption, because the Nazi government had repeatedly declared that Jews and
Jewish influences posed a threat to German society, and it would therefore be in
the Reich's best interests to have Jews leave Germany. The Supreme Finance
Court held otherwise, noting that even though Jewish emigration might be benefi-
cial, such emigrants would be unlikely to promote German ideas and concepts
abroad. The departure of German Jews from the Reich was therefore "not consid-
ered particularly beneficial to the national economy."205
As the focus of official Nazi policy against the German Jews moved from
forced emigration to complete destruction, new legislation was promulgated to
effect the complete expropriation of Jewish-owned property. In April 1938, for
example, a decree required registration of all Jewish-owned property valued over
5,000 reichsmark. 206 One means of avoiding the property decree was to marry a
foreigner and then petition a court to change the registration of the property into
the foreign spouse's name. Later that year, the Municipal Court of Ebreichsdorf,
Austria,2 07 denied such a petition on grounds that the marriage was invalid be-
cause the Jewish spouse had contracted the marriage for commercial purposes. It
was not, therefore, a marriage in fact, and the registration of the property could not
be transferred. 208
D. Landlord-Tenant Relations
Under German law prior to the Nazi Revolution, tenants could not be evicted
unless their rents were in arrears or they had violated their respective leases.209
Although a law preventing Aryan landlords from renting to Jews was not in effect
until April 1939,210 the question as to whether Jews could be protected by the
tenancy laws from unwarranted eviction was raised in German courts in the begin-
ning of 1938. In several early cases, municipal courts held the laws protected
Jewish as well as Aryan tenants. In response to criticism of these decisions in the
Nazi press, the courts moved away from a literal interpretation of the law to a Nazi
view of the issues. 2 1 1 On March 9, 1938, the municipal court of Berlin-
204. See Simon Interview, supra note 103; JANOWSKY & FAG N, supra note 84, at 209. The
emigration tax amounted to 25 percent of the value of the emigrants' property in Germany. See
Simon Interview, supra note 103; JANOWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 225. This tax netted the
Reich almost 900 million reichsmark, the vast majority of which was paid by emigrating Jews.
See Hn.BEaG, supra note 32.
205. JANOWSKY & FAGEN, supra note 84, at 209-10.
206. See SNYDER, supra note 66, at 284-85. On the basis of this registration, the Ministry of
Finance was able to assess a 25 percent punitive "atonement" tax against the property of Ger-
man Jews for the assassination of the German diplomat Vom Rath in Paris by a young Jew
whose family had suffered from Nazi persecution. Hn.aER, supra note 32, at 135-38. This tax
netted the Reich over one billion reichsmark. See id. at 138.
207. Austria was annexed by Germany in March 1938.
208. See Telegrams In Brief, Tims (London), Jul. 25, 1939, at 11.
209. See THE DuAL STATE, supra note 70, at 93.
210. See JEWIsH BLACK BooK Commrrrm, supra note 200.
211. See THE DUAL STATE, supra note 70, at 93.
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Charlottenburg denied Jews access to public housing on grounds that such housing
was reserved for the German ethnic community, from which Jews had been ex-
cluded. 2 12 The Berlin-Schoneberg municipal court dropped all pretense of legal
grounding in its decision of November 7, 1938, when it declared that "the question
before the court is not a problem of the law of landlord and tenant, but a question
involving a fundamental outlook on life." The court also found incorrect the propo-
sition that the Nazi government had to order or allow through legislation every
action against Jews. As the court noted, "[i]f this were the case, it would not be
permissible to interpret the law to the disadvantage of the Jew and the Jew would
enjoy the protection of law. It is obvious that this makes no sense."213
E. Inheritance Law
As early as October 1933, a Berlin District Court held that a Jew could not act
as a referee for the administration of an estate or as an executor of a will. Although
no legislation prohibited Jews from acting in such capacities, the court held that
"[ult is the first fundamental principle of the new law to expel all persons of alien
race from public offices and functions, such as the office of an Executor of a will,
who has to rule upon the fate of German men."214
This principle was applied by a surrogate court in 1935 in litigation involving
the attempted appointment of a Jewish executor. In 1900, a trust of 5,000,000
marks had been set up by a Jewish testator to encourage agriculture and artisanship.
Under the terms of the will, a board of directors and a group of executors, all
Jewish, were appointed by the testator. The will stipulated that the surrogate court
should "appoint a suitable person from the members of the board of directors, or
from other members of the Jewish community" to the position of executor upon
the death of any of the executors. Despite the terms of the will, the court looked to
the anti-Jewish laws promulgated by the Nazi government and determined that,
since they did not explicitly permit Jews to be executors, such a right apparently
did not exist. The court's decision not to appoint the Jewish nominee was upheld
on appeal to the Ministry of Justice, which served as the forum of last resort for
appeals involving trusts and endowments.2 15
Nazi dogma was also applied by the courts to block transfers of personalty.
Although there were no laws or decrees expressly prohibiting Jews from receiving
property from Aryans through devise at the time, in 1936 a Leipzig court found a
will providing for a Jew to inherit over an Aryan testator's next of kin to be invalid,
because it was contrary to good morals, sound national sentiment, and the prevail-
ing national consciousness. 2 16
F Mischlinge
One of the most disturbing aspects of the German Jewish legal response to
Nazi persecution arose from the operation of Nazi "racial" theory; namely, the
212. See id. at 93 & n.289.
213. Id. at 94 & n.290.
214. JAowsKY & FAcEN, supra note 84, at 203.
215. See id. at 204.
216. Bequest By "Aryan" To A Jew-Will Declared Invalid, TmIES (London), Oct. 19. 1936,
at 13.
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classification of people as Mischlinge, or part Jews. Early Nazi legislation, such
as the Civil Service Law, discriminated against those of "non-Aryan" origin, which
was defined as being descended from a Jewish parent or grandparent, who were
presumed Jewish if they had adhered to the Jewish faith.2 17 This definition was
adequate for Nazi purposes to "purify" the civil service, but its use outside the
bureaucracies was awkward because it included many people who were at least
half-Aryan, and therefore of value to the Nazi state. 2 18
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 discriminated against "Jews". The Interior
Ministry defined "Jew" in the Nuremberg context to mean anyone who had two or
more Jewish grandparents and was married to a Jew as of September 15, 1935, or
who adhered to the Jewish faith.2 19 An individual descended from two Jewish
grandparents ("half-Jew") who was neither married to a Jew as of September 15,
1935, nor a member of the Jewish faith; or a person with one Jewish grandparent
("quarter-Jew") who did not adhere to the Jewish faith, were not considered Jews
under the Nuremberg Laws.2 20 Such people were known as Mischlinge of the first
and second degree, respectively.22 1 From this point on, the Mischlinge were sepa-
rated from the Jews in terms of the destruction process. Although Mischlinge
could not be civil servants, lawyers, or military officers, and were discriminated
against in education, they were spared dismissal from private employment, and, in
the long run, annihilation. 222
A significant amount of litigation, therefore, occurred in attempting to deter-
mine whether people who were arguably Jewish actually adhered to the Jewish
faith. In resolving this issue, the courts looked beyond the conduct of the indi-
vidual to determine the intention behind the behavior, and specifically focused on
whether the people involved actually considered themselves to be Jewish. 223 In
1941, for example, the Supreme Administrative Court denied a petition from a
half-Jew to be classified as a Mischlinge. Although the petitioner had not been
raised as a Jew and had never affiliated himself with a synagogue, evidence showed
that the petitioner had designated himself as a Jew in filling out forms and official
documents. This created an impression with the authorities that the petitioner was
Jewish, which he did not attempt to correct. This apparent affirmation of his status
was sufficient to classify him as a Jew.224
A case brought before a Berlin municipal court that same year reveals a dark
side to the German Jewish legal response. The Jewish community organizations in
217. See HiLaaic, supra note 61, at 45.
218. See id. at 47.
219. See id. at 48.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 52 & 52 n.30. Despite Nazi agitation, the labor courts did not apply the
Nuremberg Laws to Mischlinge employees. New Nazi Action Against Jews: Race As A Reason
For Dismissal, TimEs (London), Feb. 15, 1936, at 11.
223. See HiLBERG, supra note 61, at 50. The so-called "racial" principles of the Nazi move-
ment were not the basis of the Nuremberg Laws; whether one was Jewish was a question of
religion. For example, half-Jewish people who displayed perfunctory adherence to the faith
were categorized as Mischlinge. See id at 51. On the other hand, some Germans who were
Aryan in every sense, except they had accepted the Jewish faith upon marriage, were held to be
Jewish. See id. at 52.
224. See id. at 50-51 n.24.
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Germany had, by this time, been given the responsibility for administering social
welfare programs for the increasingly impoverished Jewish communities. 225 As
part of this effort, the Berlin community organization demanded personal financial
information from a half-Jew who had left his synagogue in 1929 when he married
a Christian woman. The man refused, and the community organization went to
court to establish that he was Jewish because he adhered to the Jewish faith, and
therefore required to provide the information. The court found for the defendant,
noting that because the Jewish religious community had no legal personality or
public law status, quitting one's synagogue was equivalent to leaving the Jewish
religion. Other evidence, such as the defendant's membership in Nazi organiza-
tions, showed that the defendant no longer considered himself Jewish, and he there-
fore was not. This decision was affirmed on appeal.226
G. Summary and Evaluation
When examined within context, a significant amount of Jewish litigation in
response to Nazi persecution probably appeared to the Jewish litigants as having a
reasonable chance of success. The intensity and scope of anti-Jewish actions were
not uniform throughout Germany during the early years of the Third Reich. In the
area of commerce, for example, Nazi interference was not only restrained to a
degree, but limited exemptions were granted to Jewish concerns in certain cases.
Further, the conflicting aims of normative German law and Nazi statutes often
created apparent loopholes which Jewish litigants attempted to exploit to their
advantage.
The courts may have provided Jewish litigants with some encouragement,
because in many cases courts chose not to follow the Nazi Party line at first, and
applied normative concepts instead.227 Another factor that may have influenced
Jewish litigants to go to court was the great publicity the Nazi propaganda ma-
chine gave to cases in which the rights of Jews were vindicated. For example, in
November 1935, an Aryan was convicted by a Karlsruhe court of having spread a
false rumor that a certain Jew was having sexual relations with a maid in his house-
hold. The trial court sentenced the offender to eight months' imprisonment, hold-
ing that he could not slander residents of the Third Reich merely because they
were Jewish.228 The official German news agency cited this case as proof that
Jews still had rights in Germany, and attacked reports of Nazi persecution in the
international press as "lies" 229
225. See INs'wrfn OF JEWISH AFFAIRS OF "ie JEwIsH AMERICAN Ce xcRESS, Hrn.z's TEN-YEaR
WAR ON THE JEWS 18, 25 (1943) [hereinafter TEN-YAR WAR].
226. See HI-nERG, supra note 61, at 51, 52 n.27. Under the decree of March 29, 1938. Jewish
relief organizations lost their tax exempt status. See Hn.aait, supra note 32. at 145.
227. The Central Federation of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith published a number of
articles in 1933 in its newspaper that excerpted court decisions in which the outcomes were
favorable for Jews. See LitwaR, supra note 42, at 259 n.43.
228. See Plight ofJews in Germany: Prison forSlanderer, Tms (London). Nov. 14, 1935, at 3.
229. See id at 13. Similarly, in late January 1936, a Giessen court convicted an Aryan of
attempting to extort money from a Jew. Although the accused attempted to justify his actions on
the basis that Jews were proscribed in Germany, the prosecutor argued that Germany's reputa-
tion abroad was harmed by such actions, and therefore acts like the accused's should be "vigor-
ously repressed:' The trial court sentenced the defendant to two months' confinement. See
Threats To German Jewess: "Aryan" Sent To Prison, Tnums (London), Jan. 29, 1936. at 9.
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It is significant to note that most of the suits did not directly contest Nazi
statutes and regulations, but instead resulted from parties taking advantage of their
status in the new regime to deny Jews rights previously accorded to them. The
German Jewish litigation consisted primarily of suits brought by individuals to
redress individual grievances, and usually to get immediate, short-term relief. Given
the nature and the overall effect of Jewish litigation, one could argue that it not
only failed to mitigate the course of the Holocaust, it instead drained resources and
attention away from the consideration of more forceful methods of response that
may have proved more effective. By the late 1930s, however, the increasingly
aged and impoverished German Jewish population had ever fewer means of re-
dress available to them. 230 Although litigation did not carry with it a great likeli-
hood of success, neither did it result in Nazi reprisals like those engendered by
other forms of resistance.2 3 1
IV. THE GERMAN JEWS' LEGAL RESPONSE IN AREAS UNDER THE SUPERVISION
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
A. The Saar
Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations administered
the Saar as a trusteeship, and was represented in this capacity by an executive
body, the Governing Commission, whose five members were chosen by the League
of Nations Council.232 Although France assumed control of the region's coal mines
as a partial reparation for the damage done to captured French coal mines in World
War 1,233 a plebiscite was to be held in 1935 to determine whether the Saar would
rejoin Germany or become part of France.234 The Versailles Treaty allowed the
Bavarian and Prussian civil and criminal courts which existed in the region to
continue to operate within their old jurisdictions, but the Governing Commission
was given the authority to create a Supreme Court to hear appeals from decisions
of these courts, and to hear matters which were outside their jurisdiction.2 35 The
230. The German-Jewish population in 1933 numbered approximately 550,000, or slightly
less than one percent of the total German population of approximately 67 million. See
GRUNBERGER, supra note 71, at 460; TEN-YEAR WAR, supra note 225, at 8; 1938 BRrrrANICA BOOK
OF THE YEAR 60 (1938). In 1925, 40 percent of the German Jewish population was over 40 years
of age; by 1941, primarily through emigration, this figure increased to 70 percent. TEN-YEAR
WAR, supra note 225, at 9.
231. See McKALE, supra note 98, at 162-63, for a description of the Kristallnacht Pogrom
which followed the assassination of vom Rath. In one case in November 1941, however, the
Jewish litigants who had successfully fought a fine levied on them by a Berlin food rationing
office were immediately sent to a death camp. See Hi.BERG, supra note 61, at 102-03.
232. See W. R. BisscHop, THE SAAR CoNmovEmsy 22-24 (1962).
233. See id. at 18 n.2. The Saar mines contained 25 percent of the total known German coal
reserves and more coal than all the French mines combined. See WAr, supra note 129, at 425.
234. See BisscHop, supra note 232, at 18-19 n.2.
235. See id. at 31; see also SARAH WAMBAUGH, THE SAAR PLEiscrr 60 (1940). The Supreme
Court established by the treaty sat at Saarlouis, and took the place of the Bavarian court of
appeal in Zweibruecken and the Prussian district court in Cologne. See id. at 77. A High Ad-
ministrative Court of Appeal was also established at Saarlouis as the appellate authority for the
local administrative courts. See id. at 78.
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Court had eleven members: three Swiss, two Saarlanders, two French, one Bel-
gian, one Dutch, one Luxembourger, and one from Czechoslovakia. 23 6 Through-
out the fifteen years of the Court's existence, the Chief Justice was always Swiss.237
During the course of the League administration, public sentiment in the re-
gion remained overwhelmingly in favor of complete reunification with Germany.238
As an example of the Allies' and the League of Nations' dismemberment of Ger-
many, the Saar figured prominently in the Nazi Party's political program, which
encouraged agitation against the League of Nations administration.239 After the
March 5, 1933 German national elections, the Nazi press in the Saar began attack-
ing Jews.24° In response to this libelous campaign, the Governing Commission
suspended the publication of the main Nazi Party organ, Die Saarfront, for a two-
week period in April 1933, and permanently banned Der Stuermer from being
distributed in the region.241 Although the Governing Commission also declared
the Nazi Party's anti-Jewish boycott to be illegal, Nazi groups continued to agitate
for and to surreptitiously impose discriminatory measures on the Jewish inhabit-
ants of the Saar.242
As in Germany, the judges of the local Saar courts found themselves under
pressure from Nazi organizations, and quite likely their parent Bavarian and Prus-
sian judicial bureaucracies, to conform their decisions to Nazi policies.243 Many
judges began showing an obvious degree of leniency toward Nazi Party members
and sympathizers in their decisions.244 The French government formally pro-
posed use of neutral judges in such cases,245 but the strong pro-Germany feelings
of the overwhelmingly German populace prevented any action on this sugges-
tion. 246 A pro-Nazi attitude infected other areas of the judicial system as well, but
Jewish lawyers could occasionally use this bias to their client's advantage. In
1934, a Polish Jew who worked as a metal salvager was convicted on dubious theft
charges and sentenced to a year's imprisonment. The Jewish defense attorney
approached the prosecutor afterward, and taking note of Chancellor Hitler's stated
desire to expel all Jews from Germany, offered to arrange for the defendant and his
family to leave Germany completely if the prosecutor would agree to release the
man. The prosecutor had the defendant released, and the defense attorney led the
man and his family across the border into France that very day.247
236. See fi at 77.
237. See id at 77-78.
238. See id. at 132. The Saarlanders were thoroughly Germanicized, having been under
French control for only 23 years of their history. See also WATt, supra note 129, at 426.
239. See VAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 131-32.
240. See id at 132. Prior to 1933, the Jewish population of the Saar was approximately
4,000, or 0.5 percent of the total population. See id at 15.
241. See id. at 132-33.
242. See id at 133. Of the 109 lawyers in the Saar as of January 1, 1933.20 were Jewish. See
TEN-YEAR WAR, supra note 225, at 34. The Saar Bar Association voted down a proposal by
member Nazi lawyers to restrict its membership to Aryans. The 35 Nazi members then with-
drew from the association and formed their own organization. See id at 35.
243. The judges of the existing courts had been allowed to stay there by their respective state
governments. See VAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 161-62.
244. See id at 161.
245. See id
246. See iL at 162.
247. See Alberti Interview, supra note 59.
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As the time for the plebiscite neared, preparations began for the administra-
tion of the registration and voting procedures. The Saar was divided into eight
electoral districts, and the plebiscite arrangements in each district were supervised
by a voting bureau appointed by the League of Nations. 24 8 Decisions and acts of
the voting bureaus could be appealed to their respective district plebiscite tribu-
nals.249 Further, certain specified offenses involving plebiscite matters were placed
within the jurisdiction of the district plebiscite tribunals.2 50 The appellate author-
ity for the district tribunals was a newly created Supreme Plebiscite Court, which
sat in Saarbruecken. 25 1 The Supreme Plebescite Court had a President, a Vice-
President, six judges, and an examining magistrate.2 52 Five members constituted
a quorum, and decisions were made by a majority vote.25 3 None of the officials of
the plebiscite tribunals could be French, German, or Saarlanders.2 54
During the tense period that preceded the plebiscite, both the Saar Supreme
Court and the plebiscite tribunals proved to be fora in which the rights of Jewish
Saarlanders could be vindicated. When the pro-Nazi Der Deutsche Kumpel pub-
lished an article attacking a particular Jewish merchant, the Saarbruecken tribunal
sentenced the editor to a fine of 1,000 francs or twenty days' confinement.25 5 In
December 1934, the Nazi newspaper, Das Westland, published a list of Jewish
Saarlanders whom it claimed had contributed money to the organizations that sought
to have the Saar kept under League of Nations control. Subsequently, the listed
individuals were subjected to a boycott. On December 5, 1934, the Saar Supreme
Court enjoined the further distribution of the particular issue of the newspaper
containing the list under pain of a 5,000 franc fine.25 6 As a measure of the contin-
ued application of normative legal concepts, it is important to note that in these
cases, as compared to German Supreme Court decisions as early as 1933, the plain-
tiffs' Jewishness was a factor only in the sense that it established they were the
individuals subjected to the libelous attacks. The fact that the plaintiffs were Jew-
ish was irrelevant in deciding whether the libels were somehow justified.
During the course of the plebiscite negotiations, Germany agreed to allow the
Supreme Plebiscite Court to remain in operation for one year after the plebiscite to
hear complaints of discrimination by official decision or legislative act against
individuals having the right to vote.2 57 The Supreme Plebiscite Court was autho-
248. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 175.
249. See id. at 230.
250. See id. at 176.
251. See id. at 230. Each of these courts was composed of one judge, although others might
be attached to the courts depending upon the situation. See id. at 176.
252. See id. at 175.
253. See id. at 175-76.
254. See id. at 176.
255. See id. at 249 n.126.
256. See id. at 274-75.
257. See id. at 179. On May 14, 1934, a committee of Jewish delegations requested that the
League of Nations extend the system of minority treaties to the Saar. The committee also re-
quested that Germany agree in advance to protect minority rights in the event the plebiscite was
in its favor, including the right to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations. See Geneva
Publishes Hungary's Charge, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1934, at 12. Germany adamantly refused to
consider such an arrangement. See TEN-YAR WAR, supra note 225, at 35.
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rized to issue final judgments in such cases and to award damages as appropri-
ate.258 In the Franco-German Agreement of Rome, signed on December 3. 1934,
Germany also agreed to let those who wished to leave the Saar after the plebiscite
freely dispose of their property, and not to implement discriminatory measures
until March 1, 1936.259
Ninety percent of the voters in the plebiscite were in favor of the Saar return-
ing to German control.260 Although the plebiscite was a major foreign policy
victory for the Nazi government, it was by necessity a victory with conditions
favorable to Jews. It is doubtful that France would have as easily agreed to relin-
quish control over the Saar without securing guarantees protecting minorities, and
at this point the Nazi government still desired the legitimacy engendered by good
publicity.261 One guarantee under the RomeAgreement of great practical value to
many Jews was the exemption of emigrants from payment of the emigration tax.262
Further, Nazi leaders were anxious to avoid adjudication of the Rome Agreement,
and often went to great pains to remind all government officials to adhere to the
agreement so that cases would not be brought before the Supreme Plebiscite
Court.2 63 In fact, Jewish attorneys could sometimes use the threat of a suit to
force recalcitrant Nazi officials to perform their duty under the agreement.2 64
The majority of prosperous Jews left the Saar during the spring of 1935, but a
great number of poor refugees remained in the territory when the Nazi anti-Jewish
laws went into effect on March 1, 1936.265
B. Upper Silesia
The original draft of the Versailles Treaty provided that the Prussian district of
Upper Silesia was to be unconditionally ceded back to newly reconstituted Po-
land.266 In the face of strong German protests against the complete cession of the
region267 and ethnic violence between German and Polish Upper Silesians, how-
ever, the Allies agreed to hold a plebiscite to determine the future of the region
instead.268 The plebiscite was held in late March 1921, and a new German-Polish
frontier was to be fixed on the basis of the results 269
Attempts to draw a mutually satisfactory boundary according to the plebiscite
vote were frustrated by the dense and interdependent industrial development of the
258. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 180.
259. See SNYDER, supra note 65, at 201-05; see also Arnaldo Cortesi, France and Reich Agree
on a Saar Payment Plan; Pact Protects Minorities, N.Y. Tt.,ms, Dec. 4, 1934, at 1.
260. See VAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 306.
261. See HAJA HoLBoR, A HtsroRY OF MODERN GntuNr, 1840-1945 766 (1969).
262. See Alberti Interview, supra note 59.
263. See Chief Warns SaarNazis, N.Y. Tvtus, Aug. 9, 1935, at 10. In fact, after the plebiscite,
the Supreme Plebiscite Court's jurisdiction actually expanded, and dealt with complaints of
persecution and reprisal as well. See VABAUGH, supra note 235. at 312.
264. See Alberti Interview, supra note 59.
265. See id.; see also WAMBAUGH, supra note 235, at 315 & n.35.
266. See KAcKENBEEK, supra note 132, at 3.
267. See id. at 5-7.
268. See id. at 5.
269. See id. at 6. The results of the plebiscite were 707,605 votes in favor of remaining
united with Germany, and 479,359 votes in favor of union with Poland. See id.
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region, 270 as well as the existence of large, isolated pockets of Germans and Poles
scattered throughout the region. 27 1 In 1922, under the auspices of the League of
Nations, Germany and Poland finally negotiated a geographical division of the
area. The sovereignty of each country within its portion of Upper Silesia was to be
restricted by a complex international legal regime which was intended to ensure a
peaceful transition to full sovereignty of both states in their respective parts of the
region over a fifteen-year period.27 2
The Geneva Convention of May 15, 1922, contained detailed guarantees of
both individual and minority rights on each side of the new border, as well as
provisions governing the scope of legislative activity allowed to each state within
its respective portion of Upper Silesia.27 3 To oversee the implementation of these
provisions, the Geneva Convention established two international supervisory or-
gans, the Mixed Commission and the Arbitral Tribunal. 2 74 The Mixed Commis-
sion was given jurisdiction over public law questions, such as economic or admin-
istrative disputes between the two governments, and was composed of two Ger-
mans and two Poles, each from Upper Silesia, as well as a president of another
nationality.27 5 Although the Mixed Commission's function was primarily diplo-
matic, like the more judicially oriented Arbitral Tribunal, the Mixed Commission
was also authorized to obtain evidence and determine its own procedure. 276 The
President of the Mixed Commission was empowered to issue non-binding opin-
ions with regard to minority matters, which were forwarded to the representatives
of the pertinent state.27 7 The State Representatives were required to transmit such
opinions to their respective governments without delay.27 8
The Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction over private law questions arising un-
der the Convention, and was composed of one arbitrator appointed by Germany
and another appointed by Poland, and a president of another nationality.27 9 Al-
though the Arbitral Tribunal published its important decisions, the holdings of which
were binding upon the regular German and Polish courts and administrative au-
thorities in Upper Silesia, 2 80 its authority, like that of the Mixed Commission, was
undermined by its emphasis on conciliation in its decision-making process. 2 81
Beyond the supervisory organs, the Geneva Convention also gave minorities the
right to petition the League of Nations' Council directly, or to go through a local
270. Upper Silesia was at that time the second largest German industrial district after the
Ruhr, see HOLBORN, supra note 261, at 601-602, and accounted for over 20 percent of German
coal production. See id. at 376.
271. See KAECKENBEECK, supra note 132, at 6.
272. See id. at 11-12, 25.
273. See id. at 25. The Convention also covered the areas of labor organization, the rights of
choice of nationality and residence, and economic policy. See id.
274. See id at 27.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 29, 482-83.
277. See id. at 29-30.
278. See id. at 30.
279. See id. at 27.
280. See id. at 28.
281. See id. at 79.
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procedure geared toward conciliation, with ultimate appeal to the Council.2 82 The
local procedure was often ineffective, however, because considerations of national
politics tended to prevent amicable settlements. 2 83
After the Nazi electoral victory in March 1933, anti-Jewish measures were
extended to German Upper Silesia, and "unofficial actions," such as the boycott of
Jewish merchants and professionals, were also instituted.2 84 Jews apparently chal-
lenged the boycott before the Mixed Commission quite early, because the Presi-
dent of the Mixed Commission issued an opinion, published in the official gazette
of the local German government in the spring of 1933, prohibiting the boycott.28 5
After the passage of the German statute forbidding the use of kosher slaughter
methods, German Jewish Upper Silesians and Polish Jews residing in German
Upper Silesia challenged the statute before the Arbitral Tribunal. 286 Through ne-
gotiation, the President of the Mixed Commission arranged for a satisfactory settle-
ment, allowing the Arbitral Tribunal not to be forced to make a decision. 287
Despite the President of the Mixed Commission's declaration that the applica-
tion of the German anti-Jewish statutes was inconsistent with Germany's obliga-
tions under the Geneva Convention,2 88 his opinion appears to have been initially
frustrated in the German Upper Silesian Courts as well as the Convention organs.2 89
Finally, under the direct appeal provision of the Convention, Franz Bernheim, a
German Jewish Upper Silesian, petitioned the Council of the League of Nations on
May 12, 1933.290 Although his individual claim for damages was based upon his
dismissal from his job under the German anti-Jewish laws, Bernheim's petition
also noted the dismissal of Jewish officials, the restrictions on Jewish profession-
als, and the Nazi boycott of Jewish concerns which had also occurred in Upper
Silesia.2 9 1 Germany strongly objected to the petition at the League of Nations,792
but the Council found the German laws and administrative actions at issue vio-
lated the Geneva Convention.2 93 In early June 1933, Germany agreed to suspend
282. See hi at 230. Under the local procedure, a petition was first sent to a Minorities Office,
one of which existed in each part of the plebiscite territory. If the office could not satisfy the
petitioner, the petition was then sent to the Mixed Commission. The President then issued an
opinion which was forwarded by the responsible Minorities Office to the competent authorities.
The Minorities Office would then inform the President of the Mixed Commission of the respec-
tive government's decision whether to take his opinion into account. If the government's action
was unsatisfactory to the petitioner, the petitioner could then appeal to the League of Nations'
Council. See id.
283. See id at 231.
284. See Reich Retreat On Silesian Jews, N.Y. Tuis, May 22, 1933, at 9.
285. k BEcKr.c,, supra note 132, at 359-60.
286. See id. at 79 n.1.
287. See id
288. See id; Reich Retreat On Silesian Jews, N.Y. Tams, May 22, 1933, at 9.
289. See KAEcKENBEEc, supra note 132, at 266.
290. See id at 262; Treatment Of Jews In Upper Silesia: Petition To League Council. Tiwms
(London), May 22, 1933, at 13.
291. See KAEcKEB.EE, supra note 132, at 262.
292. See Clarence Streit, Nazi Regime Fields on Jews in Silesia; will Modify Laws, N.Y.
Tlmms, Jun. 7, 1933, at 1.
293. See KAFcKEEEca c, supra note 132, at 266.
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those laws in conflict with the Geneva Convention. 294 Bernheim's petition was
then referred back to the local minority procedure, where a settlement was reached
with his former employer.29 5
On the basis of the Bernheim case, many cases brought before the Mixed
Commission by former Jewish employees, officials and professionals who had
been dismissed on the basis of anti-Jewish statutes were settled in a similar fashion
through the local procedure.296 While public officials and private employees gen-
erally were unable to secure reinstatement, four of the lawyers and eleven of the
doctors who applied to the Mixed Commission were allowed to practice again.297
At least forty-nine petitions were filed with the Mixed Commission by Jews chal-
lenging the administrative actions of individual officials as discriminatory, but
because of the difficulty involved in proving this sort of discrimination, these pe-
titions were largely unsuccessful. 29 8 Jewish litigants did enjoy some degree of
success in stopping the libelous attacks of the Nazi media, however. In February
1934, Jewish Upper Silesians brought a petition before the Mixed Commission
protesting the distribution of Der Stuermer. On the basis of an opinion by the
President of the Mixed Commission finding favorably for the petitioners, the local
representative of the German government prohibited the distribution of the news-
paper throughout German Upper Silesia.2 99 Although this was a decision of a
mediative body rather than a court, it is evidence of the continuing application of
traditional normative concepts of law in the League of Nations system in Upper
Silesia.3 00
Upon expiration of the Geneva Convention on July 15, 1937, all German laws,
including the Civil Service Law, the Bar Admission Law, and by this time, the
Nuremberg Laws, were put into force in Upper Silesia. All Jewish officials, non-
exempt lawyers, and notaries were retired by August 31, 1937, and all such
Mischlinge were retired by December 31, 1937.301
294. See Streit, supra note 292. Despite this official undertaking by Germany, it was not
until August 8, 1934, that the German government representative in Upper Silesia issued a proc-
lamation in its official gazette that all laws and orders promulgated after April 1, 1933 and all
future anti-Jewish laws would be invalid in Upper Silesia. See KAECKENBEECK, supra note 132,
at 252.
295. See KAECKENBEECK, supra note 132, at 266. The German Minorities Office found that
Bernheim had been dismissed from his job with a private firm because of his "communistic
tendencies" and the poor quality of his work, not because of any official action by the German
authorities. Bernheim's former employer, however, settled the matter for 1,600 marks. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 266 n.2. The majority of the cases were settled by some sort of payment to the
petitioners. See id.
298. See id. at 253, 253 nn.1-7.
299. See id. at 359-60.
300. This decision must be considered in context of the Beruheim case, however. The find-
ing that Bernheim had been dismissed because of his "communistic tendencies" rather than
because he was Jewish is arguably pretextual.
301. See Reich Anti-Jewish Laws Extended To Silesia, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 1937, at 16. Of the
9,228 Jewish inhabitants of German Upper Silesia in 1933 (0.7 percent of the population), ap-
proximately 7,700 remained in the region by the end of 1936. See TEN-YEAR WAR, supra note
224, at 37-39.
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C. Danzig
Under the Treaty of Versailles, the Prussian port city of Danzig was separated
from Germany and made a free city.302 Although Danzig was much like a sover-
eign state in many ways,303 its special relationships with Poland and the League of
Nations limited the scope of its international authority and independence. Poland
was given formal control of Danzig's foreign affairs, it shared authority with the
Free City over administration of the harbor, and it had actual control over the
railroad system.304 The League was represented in Danzig by a high commis-
sioner, through whom governments and private bodies could appeal to the Council
of the League of Nations for redress.305 Although Danzig's constitution could be
amended by a two-thirds majority vote of its legislature, the Volkstag, such amend-
ments could only go into effect after having been approved by the League of Na-
tions.3 06
The Great Depression's effects on Danzig were exacerbated by an on-going
trade war with Poland. 30 7 Coupled with the strong anti-Polish sentiment of the
primarily German population, the economic crisis provided the impetus for the
Danzig Nazi Party's rise to power. In the Volkstag elections of May 28, 1933, the
Danzig Nazi Party received slightly over fifty percent of the popular vote, and a
corresponding absolute majority in the Volkstag.308 Although the Danzig Nazi
government at first only enacted discriminatory legislation against Jews which did
not violate the letter of the constitution,3 09 The Danzig Nazi Party unofficially did
not hesitate to attack minority Danzigers, such as by commencing a boycott of
Jewish commerce and harassing the Polish population.3 10
In 1935, through the high commissioner, the Jewish community presented the
League of Nations Council with two petitions concerning the discriminatory acts
of the Danzig Nazi Party and the government. 3 11 The petitions specifically chal-
lenged the anti-Jewish boycott, the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, the forced
dismissal of Jewish employees, and new legislation which restricted the entry of
Jews into the various professional organizations. 3 12 A committee of jurists ap-
302. See Hmsurr S. LEvuNE, Hm.ER's FREE Crrv: A HIs'oRy oF mE NAzi PAM W DANzIG,
1925-39 10 (1973).
303. See id. at 3.
304. See HANs L. LEoNHARDT, NAzi CONQUEST OF DANZtG 23 (1942).
305. See UL at 26. The High Commissioner could render formal decisions in cases involving
Danzig and Poland. When constitutional issues were raised by private bodies, the High Com-
missioner could "deal with them upon their merits as sources of information on the situation in
Danzig;" and within his discretion, could refer the more serious matters to the League of Na-
tions Council. See iUL at 29.
306. See id. at 57.
307. See LEvINE, supra note 301, at 13, 65-66.
308. See id. at 54.
309. See id. at 67; see also TEN-YEAx NVaR, supra note 225, at 41.
310. See LEViNE, supra note 301, at 64-65. The Jewish population of Danzig in 1929 was
approximately 10,500. See id. at 127.
311. See id. at 133. Many petitions were brought before the High Commissioner, but because
he functioned primarily as an arbitrator, results were usually sought at the local level, and not all
petitions were forwarded to the League of Nations. See id. at 109.
312. See LEoNAn/RPr, supra note 303, at 149.
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pointed to study the petitions found several aspects of the Danzig government
actions and new legislation to be contrary to the Danzig constitution, but their
findings were basically ignored by the Danzig government. 3 13 For example, the
regulations governing the civil service, the judiciary, and the bar were amended to
not specifically bar Jews, but candidates were required to be acceptable "with re-
gard to [their] personality."3 14 This obvious pretextual device shows that a person's
Jewishness was already the most significant factor in determining whether one
would receive the benefit of traditional normative concepts of law at this point. In
this sense, the state of the law in Danzig was quite similar to that of the Third
Reich by 1935.
The record of the German Jewish legal response to Nazi persecution in Danzig
courts is not well documented in English, but does not appear to have been any
more successful than in Germany proper. For example, in 1936 the Danzig Su-
preme Court dismissed a suit brought by Jewish litigants to remove anti-Jewish
posters in public places. The Court held that the complaint failed to show a viola-
tion of the Jews' rights, and that the anti-Jewish boycott was legitimate because it
was the policy of the ruling Danzig Nazi Party. The plaintiffs' subsequent protest
to the League of Nations was apparently unsuccessful. 3 15
While practical economic considerations3 16 and the League's influence in
Danzig delayed the promulgation of severe anti-Jewish laws for a significant length
of time, the Danzig Nazi Party was finally strong enough in 1938 to introduce
legislation patterned after the Nuremberg Laws. 3 17 In the face of ever- increasing
discrimination, the majority of Jewish Danzigers emigrated, and only about 1,700
remained in the Free City when it was militarized by units of the German Army
and the Danzig SS Home Defense Force on September 1, 1939.318
D. Summary and Evaluation
The three separate and different international court and mediative systems
established in the respective League of Nations enclaves led to very different re-
sults for the Jewish litigants who brought cases before them. In Danzig, the me-
diative role of the high commissioner and the absence of international fora to which
the Jews could easily appeal caused Jewish litigants to experience a pattern of
results quite similar to that experienced in the Third Reich. In Upper Silesia, where
the League commission and tribunal process was buttressed by the Geneva Con-
vention between Germany and Poland, Jewish litigants fared better than in Ger-
313. See id. at 201.
314. TEN-YEAR WAR, supra note 225, at 42. Interestingly, although they had been transferred
to less important courts after the Danzig Nazi Party came to power, two Jewish judges remained
on the bench until 1937, when they were persuaded to resign. See LEONHARDT, supra note 303,
at 325.
315. See Danzig Court Backs Boycotting of Jews, N.Y. Tiam, Aug. 5, 1936, at 7.
316. One petition to the High Commissioner in 1935 concerned anti-Jewish demonstrations
by Danzig and German Nazis, and an organized attack on Polish Jewish merchants at a trade
fair. The demonstrations stopped after Danzig tourism officials asked the German Foreign Of-
fice to exert pressure through the German Nazi Party upon Danzig Nazi officials. See LEVINE,
supra note 301, at 129.
317. See LEvmF., supra note 301, at 129-33.
318. See id. at 138, 150.
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many proper or in Danzig. Further, the quick resort to the League of Nations
appeal process in the Bernlzeim case3 19 appears to have had a positive systemic
impact on German participation and acquiesence in the commission and tribunal
processes. However, both the German and the Polish members of the commission
and tribunal systems displayed intransigence throughout the life of the League
regime based upon concerns of national interest and mutual antagonism rather
than the merits of the cases before them. Most important, the fact that the League
system was set to expire at a definite point in time had an impact upon the Jews'
legal response to Nazi persecution.
Of the three systems, the regime established in the Saar afforded Jewish liti-
gants the best chance for a meaningful legal response, albeit for a limited time.
First, in concert with the governing commission, the court system was given effec-
tive enforcement power, unlike the system in Upper Silesia which required the
often reluctant cooperation of the national administrative organs of the two mem-
ber states to effectuate its decisions. Second, even though the court system would
encourage mediation between the parties before it, it did not rely upon mediation
to the extent that the Upper Silesian system did to come to a decision. Third, the
international character of its personnel ensured disinterested adjudication of cases
before it under traditional concepts of normative law. Finally, the judicial rigor of
the League court system appeared to have an impact on local Nazi officials' ac-
tions, encouraging them to settle matters with possible litigants so that cases would
not come before the courts. As in Upper Silesia, however, the limited life of the
court system was a glaring, although politically unavoidable, defect.
V. CONCLUSION
It is still too early to tell what the eventual impacts of the Yugoslavian and
Rwandan International Criminal Tribunals will be, to say nothing of the nascent
International Criminal Court. Advocates of the tribunals recognize that, as crimi-
nal courts, the tribunals' most likely effect on the enforcement of human rights is
that of deterrence. 320 Grant Niemann, lead prosecutor before the Yugoslavian
International Criminal Tribunal in its first case, that of Dusko Tadic, has stated,
"deterrence has a better chance of working with these kinds of crimes than it does
with ordinary domestic crimes because the people who commit these acts are not
hardened criminals; they're politicians or leaders of the community that have up
until now been law abiding people.' 32 1 Unfortunately, even a quick review of
genocide in this century suggests that by the time a situation has reached the point
319. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
320. See Sca, supra note 25, at 218-19. Successful prosecutions may also bring a sense of
closure to the victims of these crimes. See Sara Darehshori, Inching Toward Justice in Rwanda.
N.Y. Tmms, Sep. 8, 1998, at A29.
321. ScHARP, supra note 25, at 219. Yugoslavia's violent oppression of its ethnic Albanian
population in Kosovo, despite the International Criminal Tribunal's continuingjurisdiction. sug-
gests that even direct deterrence may have a limited impact on whether crimes against humanity
are commissioned. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The
Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Milosevic et al. (visited June 3, 1999) <http'/Iwww.un.orgiictyl
indictmentlenglish/24-05-99milo.htm>; see Jane Perlez, War Crimes Panel Seeks A Way For
Kosovo Survivor To Testijfy, N.Y. Tzms, Oct. 1, 1998, at 1.
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where an oppressor is considering such extraordinary measures as extermination
of a targeted group, the oppressor's decision making process may not give such
deterrence much weight.
Although it did not prevent the Holocaust, nor was it intended to, a review of
the German Jews' legal response to Nazi persecution suggests that if there is a time
in the genocide process where legal means are most likely to have an impact in
preventing genocide, it is during the isolation, concentration, and expropriation
stages. As the German Federal Supreme Court noted in 1959 in upholding the
seizure of an anti-Jewish writing to be valid:
When the legislature ... expressly and especially protected the prohibition of
arbitrary acts as a constitutional principle, it proceeded from the experience with
the crimes of the National Socialist violent and arbitrary dominance.... But it is
necessary to counteract even the beginning of such occurrences, before new ra-
cial persecutions, in which violence and despotism appear under the guise of a
law or an administrative act, again poison public life.322
Given the scope of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, it is not
likely to have the opportunity to address the impact of violative legislation or acts
immediately, as the modem German Supreme Court has found necessary to effec-
tively stop the precursors of genocide in Germany. By the time criminal offenses
are likely to be adjudicated by the court, the extermination phase of the genocidal
process has probably already begun. This does not mean that an international
judicial regime would be without positive effect, however. As the experiences of
Jewish litigants in the League of Nations' court and mediative systems in the Saar,
Upper Silesia, and Danzig demonstrate, international tribunals can be very useful
in protecting human rights. Relatively uninfluenced by local politics or the proce-
dures in the local courts, the international staffs of the League courts in the Saar
continued to effectively apply the law according to normative standards up until
the time they ceased operation. Importantly, the League court and mediative sys-
tems did cease operation; for then, as now, considerations of national sovereignty
usually restrict quite strongly the lives and jurisdictions of international or multi-
national courts and mediative bodies. Over time, widespread acceptance of the
principles contained in agreements like the European Convention could generate
norms in international law which transcend notions of national sovereignty with
regard to human rights.3 23 Based upon the extensive participation of practically
the entire international community in the negotiations leading up to the creation of
the International Criminal Court, and its acceptance by most of the participating
countries, it is fair to say that the court represents a realization of this trend.
As shown by the German Jews' legal response to Nazi persecution, however,
the erosion of a targeted groups' rights can be very gradual and non-criminal in a
traditional sense. Nonetheless, such an erosion can have increasing systemic im-
pacts within a legal system over time, and can make it easier for the next round of
discriminatory measures to occur. By the time a criminal court, particularly an
extraterritorial international criminal court, could have jurisdiction over a case of
an individual accused of committing genocide, it may simply be too late. If comple-
322. Stein, supra note 11, at 321 n.173.
323. See Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3744-45.
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mented by more standing international bodies that mediate, and if necessary, adju-
dicate, cases of discrimination that do not rise to the level of international crimes,324
as well as by enforcement mechanisms to bring defendants before it when interna-
tional crimes do occur,325 the International Criminal Court would stand a better
chance of playing an effective part in the enforcement of human rights.
324. See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Press Communique NAC- S(99)65,11 10,20,24,
31,48 (visitedApr. 27, 1999) <http'//www.USIA.gov/topical/POLINATOS0/Text9904241 l.htm>.
The new NATO strategic concept formalizing its decision to intervene outside the NATO area
when the abuse of human rights and human suffering are having an impact upon the stability of
the NATO area of interest is a welcome and significant development in this regard. While the
NATO actions in both Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated that military force is a very effec-
tive means to stop an oppressor's genocidal activities, using a military force as a police force to
compel a defendant's presence before a criminal tribunal is an expensive and politically com-
plex proposition.
325. See ScRARn, supra note 25, at 228.
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